Chastising Their Insolence

480px-Edward_Moran_Burning_of_the_PhiladelphiaRegardless of one’s position on “imperialism,” “neo-imperialism,” “liberal internationalism,” and other attempts to describe, project, or critique an American role in the world, the assumption that a nation will seek to take care of its own hardly counts as unusual, and rather more counts as obviously required by any meaningful concept of national community. If there will be exceptions to the general rule, times that we may choose to look away or may simply fail to recognize our responsibility to each other, the high-definition murder of American journalists, submitted as a direct political challenge and broadcasted to the world, would not likely be one of them.

Democratic Senator Bill Nelson put the matter succinctly if a bit narrowly: “All you need to do is see the videos of the beheading, and then you’re not worried about mission-creep.” I offered my own version of the same argument immediately after the Foley execution: In sum, it is hard to imagine a world in which acts like the murders of James Foley and Steven Sotloff simply as Americans, in connection with an American decision to rescue others from imminent annihilation, did not produce among Americans a demand for punishment as both practical and moral necessity. Yet there is a tendency even among many would-be supporters of President Obama, or of his plans to “degrade and ultimately destroy” “the group known as ISIL,” to diminish and disdain politically aggravated homicides as actual and compelling bases for a specifically American reaction. We are asked to treat our outrage as mere emotion divorceable from supposedly more serious concerns: “Not something for the US to wind itself into a tizzy over” were the ill-considered words of one journalist. If usually more judiciously, area experts and all-purpose pundits alike will typically revert to modes of analysis that fail to consider the American response as, whatever else it is or becomes, a response to injury. It does not seem to matter to the legion of critics how much emphasis the President puts on what he calls a “core principle of [his] presidency,” as he reiterated it in his speech to the nation: “If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” They warn of obstacles to achievement of a desirable end state in and around Iraq and Syria, or even of “a trap,” but seem never to recognize that failing to react – even if only to render exemplary punishment of the executioners and their friends – would also entail practical consequences, not only in regard to the offender’s future calculations or abilities to repeat or escalate, and not only in regard to the conduct of potential imitators, but in regard to our concept of ourselves, which in turn is not a matter of statistical cross-comparison of theoretically similar instances.

In another era it would have been easier to justify military action in the language of honor, also the language of class, though it would be another mistake, or another version of the same mistake, to treat honor as an obsolete idea rather than a term for inherited knowledge of how the world works, in particular in regard to how and why we come to fight, or discover a will to fight. According to a recent poll conducted after the President’s speech, a large majority of Americans favor action even while, in even greater numbers, not expecting it to “eliminate” the group known as ISIL. The seeming contradiction, some substantial segment of opinion seemingly in favor of a project expected to fail, is easy to explain in human terms: We do not now actually require the group to be fully eliminated – assuming we could even agree on what level of destruction equated with elimination. We require that its members now suffer grievous punishment at our hands, and we know we are capable of causing them to suffer and die virtually without limit, a fact whose brute significance they, and anyone tempted to stand too close to them, may come to recognize.

A bit more than two hundred years ago, on the occasion of America’s first overseas intervention, a president received authority not to eradicate the “Barbary Powers” or extinguish the practice of piracy, but to “protect our commerce & chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & Vessels.” That president, Thomas Jefferson, who was long acquainted with the issue of state-supported piracy, especially hated for the practice of abducting Westerners, acted with broad popular and congressional support, though without a formal declaration of war. Among the results of the ensuing actions involving a detachment of only six ships was the first American military victory on foreign soil, on “the shores of Tripoli.” Prior to that point, the American frigate Philadelphia, which had been captured and turned against the American Navy, was set on fire: hardly the last time American arms would fall into an enemy’s possession, and have to be destroyed. Though we may imagine an 1804 Twitter reacting with the sophomoric snark that is our 2014 default, no doubt with additional concern over merely producing more pirates, the action by a small group of Marines under the command of Lt. Stephen Decatur was called “the most bold and daring act of the age” by no less a figure than Admiral Horatio Nelson. As for greater matters, over the course of decades, Barbary piracy was in fact eradicated, with the aid of allies who prior to the American intervention had previously been content to pay ransom and tribute.

As for the, of course, in many ways very different efforts today and going forward against a different type of enemy of humankind, it may well be that American words and actions already imply or eventually will require annihilation of this peculiar Levantine and Iraqi movement in detail, alongside escalated investment in the welfare of many who, at least in American eyes, rightly or wrongly, may not seem to qualify as particularly deserving recipients. Responding to a particular injury does not preclude response to larger or supposedly larger matters: Confronted directly, such events reveal their greater significance spontaneously, and, more important, authentically engage us in it. In the meantime, however, if we needed to burn Philadelphia – the city itself, not a ship – then we might do so, if that is what it took for us to send the necessary message to the enemy, and to the world, and to ourselves.

Tagged with: , , , , , ,
Posted in Featured, The Exception, US History, War
0 comments on “Chastising Their Insolence
3 Pings/Trackbacks for "Chastising Their Insolence"
  1. […] development and actions of ISIL have threatened American interests and impugned American honor; therefore, it must be confronted. Policymakers should take both threats seriously, and acknowledge […]

  2. […] If I find the time, I will finish and publish a more developed piece on America’s stance toward the Islamic State, partly in response to a post on by Adam Elkus and Nick Prime that, in the process of proposing a theory for understanding and formulating American anti-IS strategy and policy, happened to link to a post here. […]

  3. […] authors even link to one of this blog’s treatments of the topic. […]

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

*

us v is

  • Chastising Their Insolence
    It is hard to imagine a world in which acts like the murders of James Foley and Steven Sotloff simply as Americans, in connection with an American decision to rescue others from imminent annihilation, did not produce among Americans a demand for punishment as both practical and moral necessity. Yet there is a tendency even among many would-be supporters of President Obama, or of his plans to "degrade and ultimately destroy" "the group known as ISIL," to diminish and disdain politically aggravated homicides as actual and compelling bases for a specifically American reaction.
  • IS/ISIS/ISIL/QSIS/Daesh-related links 2014.8.20-9
    ...plus a few observations as tweeted. I'm sure I missed a few good pieces (possibly while I was busy yesterday, for instance). Please feel free to link anything interesting or useful in the comments.
  • What's So Funny about Degradation and Ultimate Destruction?
    If I find the time, I will finish and publish a more developed piece on America's stance toward the Islamic State, partly in response to a post on by Adam Elkus and Nick Prime that, in the process of proposing a theory for understanding and formulating American anti-IS strategy and...
  • us v is (What's So Funny... 2)
    ...you do seem, at least, to be endlessly rationalizing U.S. imperial overreach, as if it were some sort of grand strategy upholding universal “liberal democracy”, where I tend to see incoherence, disintegration and devolution, on the part of grossly incompetent, irresponsible and ignorant ruling elites. To which I would reply:...
  • 13 Tweets Instead of a Syria Strategy
    IN THE SHADOW OF INSTEAD RT @rmslim: By far this is one of z best, if not z best analysis, of unfolding devepts in the Arab region penned by Yezid Sayigh http://t.co/zMW7oGUsKZ 09:52:10, 2014-08-29 #prt among most interesting aspects the piece is brief alternative history asserted in 1st para on...
  • IS or ISIL or ISIS or Daesh as "existential" threat
    My comment today at "Ordinary Times" (first in more than a year): You think you want to live in a world where the murder of Americans as Americans, or politically, could be broadcast to all, in connection with the rescue of innocents from genocide, and our response would be indirectly...
  • Essential Threat
    The Foley atrocity can be taken as a tipping point event or last straw, but it is also a typical exception, and his killing a uniquely representative event.
  • Fact, Value, and the Destruction of Daesh
    Not very long ago, "Islamic state" might have referred to a Western stereotype of "Mohammadean" passivity and fatalism. Today, while the West sometimes seems to have been overtaken by the condition or some version of it, the phrase now stands for something rather else in public discussion: It conjures images...
  • Fighting "The Islamic State"
    Referring to the group simply as "IS" quietly constitutes the enemy as "the Islamic State," and reinforces perception of the struggle as anti-Islamic for some, for others as significantly a different thing: anti-Islamist.
  • The Egyptian Exception and the Other Islamic State
    The alternative resolution or the other Islamic state, the one that avoids the tyrant’s despair – or, put more politically-philosophically, allows for a liberal-Islamic assimilation that would also be integrative or unitary rather than irrecuperably conflictual – would appear to rely on modes of idealization of religion that would evolve simultaneously and bi-conditionally, or, as Fadel or Fadel’s Khaldun puts it, “organically.” Their current impermissibility is a reflection of the same problem.
  • replying to a comment on comments - part 2 (us v is)
    (continuing reply to jch's comment, with same proviso as before) 4 - Current Events or: Hegemony, What Is It/Good For? Now to current events, as we return to the original point of my intervention under the Quiggan post. jch says: Whereas ISTM that heedless U.S. doings (and the “Peter principle”...
  • Wanted: Casus Belli (for the US, against the Assad Regime)
    Blog version of Storify post:
  • Collateral Casualty of the War against War
    Carl Schmitt might have been amused by the criticism John Kerry has received for declining to characterize operations against ISIS as "war": U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Thursday would not say the United States is at war with ISIS, telling CNN in an interview that the administration's strategy...
  • Melhem's Compulsions (the two-sided failure in Syria contd.)
    In an article published today in Al-Arabiya, Hisham Melhem devotes his main attention to the idea that the Middle East is becoming "less Arab" in a way that helps to explain a commensurate adaptation of U.S. policy. [T]he U.S. sees a diminishing Arab influence brought about by the erosion of...
  • Eve of Containment
    Summary: A year ago, Americans were being asked to kill non-enemies because it was abstractly right; now are being asked to kill enemies at war with us.
  • Failure of the US-Syrian Rebel Alliance Is Two-Sided
    Syrians may be forgiven for viewing their monster as the worst monster, without question, but forgiving the Syrians and sympathizing with them, and wishing them well, even trying to find ways to aid them, are not the same as making war with and for them.
  • "no uplifting realist"
    Leon Wieseltier, in "Obama Was Wrong[:] The Era of Humanitarian Intervention Is Not Over": Barack Obama believed that he could preside over the end of humanitarian intervention, which he called simply war. He was momentously wrong... History, whose course he thought he knew, has trapped him. Obama can no longer...
  • Islamic Statism and Historical Necessity
    Shadi Hamid begins his essay on "The Roots of the Islamic State's Appeal" by noting first the tendency of political scientists, including himself, to see "religion, ideology, and identity" as "products of a given set of material factors." In the next, second sentence he identifies this same materialism as a...

Related

In Progress

Support This Site?