Assad Song

The Syrian Time Bomb – By Patrick Seale | Foreign Policy

If the Syrian regime were to be severely weakened by popular dissent, if only for a short while, Iran’s influence in Arab affairs would almost certainly be reduced — in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. In Lebanon, it would appear that Hezbollah has already been thrown on the defensive. Although it remains the most powerful single movement, both politically and on account of its armed militia, its local enemies sense a turning of the tide in their favor. This might explain a violent speech delivered earlier this month by the Sunni Muslim leader and former prime minister Saad Hariri, in which he blatantly played the sectarian card.

Cheered by his jubilant supporters, he charged that Hezbollah’s weapons were not so much a threat to Israel as to Lebanon’s own freedom, independence, and sovereignty — at the hand of a foreign power, namely Iran. The Syrian uprisings may have already deepened the sectarian divide in Lebanon, raising once more the specter of civil war and making more difficult the task of forming a new government, a job President Michel Suleiman has entrusted to the Tripoli notable, Najib Mikati. If Syria were overrun with internal strife, Hezbollah would be deprived of a valuable ally — no doubt to Israel’s great satisfaction.

Meanwhile, Turkey is deeply concerned by the Syrian disturbances: Damascus has been the cornerstone of Ankara’s ambitious Arab policy. Turkey-Syria relations have flourished in recent years as Turkey-Israel relations have grown cold. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, have actively sought to mediate local conflicts and bring much-needed stability to the region by forging close economic links. One of their bold projects is the creation of an economic bloc comprising Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan — already something of a reality by the removal of visa requirements as well as by an injection of Turkish investment and technological know-how. A power struggle in Syria could set back this project; and regime change in Damascus would likely put a serious dent in further Turkish initiatives.

Turkey’s loss, however, may turn out to be Egypt’s gain. Freed from the stagnant rule of former President Hosni Mubarak, Cairo is now expected to play a more active role in Arab affairs. Instead of continuing Mubarak’s policy, conducted in complicity with Israel, of punishing Gaza and isolating its Hamas government, Egypt is reported to be pushing for a reconciliation of the rival Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah. If successful, this could help defuse the current dangerous escalation of violence between Israel on the one side and Hamas and still more extreme Gaza-based Palestinian groups on the other. But Syria’s internal troubles might just as easily have a negative effect.

Undoubtedly, the failed peace process has bred extreme frustration among Palestinian militants, some of whom may think that a sharp shock is needed to wrench international attention away from the Arab democratic wave and back to the Palestine problem. They are anxious to alert the United States and Europe to the danger of allowing the peace process to sink into a prolonged coma. Israeli hard-liners, too, may calculate that a short war could serve their purpose: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right government may sense weakness and quietly dream of finishing off Hamas once and for all. Syria has been a strong supporter of Hamas and has given a base in Damascus to the head of its political bureau, Khaled Mashal. Turmoil in Damascus could deal Hamas a severe blow.

On all these fronts — Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel — Syria is a key player. But its internal problems now threaten to reshuffle the cards, adding to the general sense of insecurity and latent violence in the region. And of all the threats facing the Middle East, perhaps the greatest — greater even than of another Arab-Israeli clash — is that of rampant sectarianism, poisoning relationships between and within states, and breeding hate, intolerance, and mistrust.

5 comments on “Assad Song

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  1. For most of his decade in power, Assad has deployed his heavily ideological foreign policy as a tool to generate domestic support and ward off opposition. His assumption is two-fold: that Arab leaders who ally themselves with the U.S. and Israel will infuriate their people, perhaps to the point of violence; and that Arab peoples are willing to overlook oppression, corruption, and all the ugly hallmarks of a police state so long as the government makes itself an enemy of the U.S. and Israel. Assad has been governing from his belief that Arabs, in other words, are more driven by an inherent anti-Americanism than they are by any desire for domestic freedoms. It’s long been an article of faith among Western analysts and academics that, whatever Assad’s true motivations, his rabidly anti-American policies afford him a greater degree of popular legitimacy, public support, and, as a result, regime stability.

    —Max Fisher


    so now I figure that Assad, as he fires his own government,is going to announce a sweeping campaign against corruption and a return to that old-tymie purity of essence as he promises Syria a brave new future.

  2. We’ll see. Speaking as a tyrant, I find that concessions mainly embolden the disobedient, yet at certain times they are expedient. Now that someone‘s killed a couple of hundred, the state has set the choice of a bloodbath or suspension of disbelief before the opposition and the general populace.

    The FP article does suggest a “violent” power struggle may have been going on. It was said when Assad first succeeded Daddy, an exemplary bastard if ever there was one, that he ruled at the pleasure of the men behind the scenes. Any reason to believe that in 15 years he’s built up his own independent support structure strong enough to allow him to chart his own course? The same thing that doesn’t make him look the part of tyrant makes you think he probably hasn’t, meaning he can’t offer real concessions.

    If, however, his wife were to give the big speech, that might heighten will to believe:

    Some say she is the most beautiful first lady in the world. Now how could a reasonable Syrian just kick THAT to the curb?

  3. most things suggest otherwise, that he doesn’t even fully control the extended Assad family. Ignatius run something suggestive of that in the WaPo yesterday or the day before.

    wouldn’t bother me if even a good-looking woman gets croaked alongside the rest of them, but enjoy yourself.

    this is more the face of a woman close to Assad, though.

    Dr.Bouthaina Shaaban

  4. One almost has to have a little sympathy for Michael (I mean Bashar)he went to medical school, became a opthalmologist, and then was called home, to take care of the family business, which is much morecomplicated than the deal with the Barzinis and the Tataglia. You have the old deal with Hezbollah and Iran, you have the security services, which for a generation were trained by the KGB/GRU and old man Fischer, So Ghassan probably ordered the hit on Hariri, well that’s just water under the bridge. Along with running
    the ratlines from Damascus into Iraq, ‘you have to break a few eggs’ right

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