The US is running out of options in the Persian Gulf

Iraq, Iran and the Next Move | STRATFOR

On April 18, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s adviser for military affairs, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, warned Saudi Arabia that it, too, could be invaded on the same pretext that the kingdom sent forces into Bahrain to suppress a largely Shiite rising there. Then, on April 23, the commander of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, remarked that Iran’s military might was stronger than that of Saudi Arabia and reminded the United States that its forces in the region were within range of Tehran’s weapons. Again, the Iranians are not about to make any aggressive moves, and such statements are intended to shape perception and force the Saudis to capitulate on the negotiating table.

The Saudis want regime survival above all else. Deciding between facing Iran alone or reaching an unpleasant accommodation, the Saudis have little choice. We would guess that one of the reasons the UAE is reaching out to Obama is to try to convince him of the dire consequences of inaction and to move the United States into a more active role.

A Strategy of Neglect

The Obama administration appears to have adopted an increasingly obvious foreign policy. Rather than simply attempt to control events around the world, the administration appears to have selected a policy of careful neglect. This is not, in itself, a bad strategy. Neglect means that allies and regional powers directly affected by the problem will take responsibility for the problem. Most problems resolve themselves without the need of American intervention. If they don’t, the United States can consider its posture later. Given that the world has become accustomed to the United States as first responder, other countries have simply waited for the American response. We have seen this in Libya, where the United States has tried to play a marginal role. Conceptually, this is not unsound.

The problem is that this will work only when regional powers have the weight to deal with the problem and where the outcome is not crucial to American interests. Again, Libya is an almost perfect example of this. However, the Persian Gulf is an area of enormous interest to the United States because of oil. Absent the United States, the regional forces will not be able to contain Iran. Therefore, applying this strategy to the Persian Gulf creates a situation of extreme risk for the United States.

Re-engagement in Iraq on a level that would deter Iran is not a likely option, not only because of the Iraqi position but also because the United States lacks the force needed to create a substantial deterrence that would not be attacked and worn down by guerrillas. Intruding in the Arabian Peninsula itself is dangerous for a number reasons, ranging from the military challenge to the hostility an American presence could generate. A pure naval and air solution lacks the ability to threaten Iran’s center of gravity, its large ground force.

Therefore, the United States is in a difficult position. It cannot simply decline engagement nor does it have the ability to engage at this moment — and it is this moment that matters. Nor does it have allies outside the region with the resources and appetite for involvement. That leaves the United States with the Saudi option — negotiate with Iran, a subject I’ve written on before. This is not an easy course, nor a recommended one, but when all other options are gone, you go with what you have.


7 comments on “The US is running out of options in the Persian Gulf

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  1. And the reason why the Iranians wouldn’t intervene, would be what again, and legitimating Ahmadinejad’s rogue regime, helps us how.

  2. miguel cervantes wrote:

    And the reason why the Iranians wouldn’t intervene, would be what again, and legitimating Ahmadinejad’s rogue regime, helps us how.

    Don’t understand the first part – “intervene” where?

    The issues for Friedman are interrelated: securing and stabilizing oil production (and prices), reducing the risk of a major conflagration, and setting up a self-regulating regional balance. If it means that Iran prospers for a time, led by A-jad, Mickey Mouse, or Satan’s stepchild, that’s secondary if not irrelevant to US geopolitical interests.

  3. @ miguel cervantes:
    Under the current situation, Iran has incentives to incite and support uprisings. Under a grand bargain – which, yes, fuster, Friedman and I both know the U.S. has had an offer but the Iranians have resisted – it would have other things to do and benefits to enjoy for not doing so, while any intervention would give the US and allies a pretext for sterner measures, perhaps to be applied at a time when not pinned down in Afghanistan, still extricating forces from Iraq, and still watching events in the region play out.

    One of Friedman’s models is Nixon-China.

  4. the “strategy of neglect” is having interesting results in the Gulf. The expansionist threat to the other Gulf states through Iran’s increasingly overt subversion is forcing an increasingly overt response from usually reticent regimes.

  5. @ fuster:
    The Gulf states are acting, yes. The question is whether they can act effectively enough. Don’t know if you read the rest of the article. Most of it concerns Iraq.

    The simplest conclusion, given the region’s history and the multiple conflicting alliances and sources of instability, is that things are going to spin out of control somewhere and get very violent when one of the kids knocks over another’s sand castles. Thus the risk premium on oil. (Though I did hear one ekspurt saying he thought prices would come down significantly this Summer.)

  6. Not sure what you mean by “effectively enough”.

    one thing that I do know is that there are many, many dissidents in Iran and many groups willing and able to do different things inside Iran…if they get the money for them.

    Several such groups, particularly ones in broadcast media have everything except the cash and feel that they can’t be effective if they take the money from US/EU govt sources.
    They get the money from nice clean Islamic sources might be different.

    Also there are other groups inside that concluded after the Iranian election protests were crushed that they want to take very direct action against the regime. Some of those folks said good-bye to their Western contacts because they were going black.
    Those folks might find themselves getting direct support from the Arab part of the Arabian Gulf.

    The GCC is working directly now to thwart Hezbollah and the Saudis might soon have stuff to say about Syria.

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