Here’s How We’ll Be GTFO (mostly) A-stan

The Coming Afghan Drawdown | Swampland

There’s the death of Osama bin Laden, of course; and the cache of documents seized in the operation that might lead to the capture of other al-Qaeda leaders (some of whom may decide to hie toward the newly anarchic failed state of Yemen, or to Somalia, just across the Red Sea). But there’s also the success of the U.S. military efforts during the last fighting season, clearly the Taliban out of their natural heartland in Kandahar and much of Helmand provinces. That success means that reconciliation talks with the Taliban are more plausible now. Negotiations to begin negotiations have already started. And, finally, there is the ongoing domestic economic crisis–and the ever-strengthening argument that the President’s time and coin should be spent at home.

The main fight remaining is in Regional Command-East, against the Haqqani branch of the Taliban, which is funded and harbored by our lovely friends, the Pakistanis. That will be the center of attention this summer and fall (although work–the holding and building stages–will continue in areas of Kandahar and Helmand that were cleared last year). A strong argument can be made that neutralizing the Haqqanis will be handled in a renewed diplomatic process, part of quadrilateral peace talks among NATO, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban. Certainly, the Pakistanis should be getting the message that continued congressional support for military and economic aid will hinge on their willingness to stop playing these lethal games.

In any case, I wouldn’t be surprised if President Obama announced a major withdrawal process that will begin with the departure of a few troops this summer (and the transition of mostly peaceful cities like Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif to Afghan government control), then begin in earnest by the end of the year, with forces down to about 50,000 a year from now and the 25,000 stabilization force by the end of 2012. The Afghan National Army ain’t the 101st Airborne, but it is strong enough, with continuing US support, to prevent a Taliban takeover of the country. That, plus the continuing covert campaign by drones and special operators, should be more than enough to protect US national interests in one of the world’s most remote places.

 

18 comments on “Here’s How We’ll Be GTFO (mostly) A-stan

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  1. @ fuster:
    Dunno. Pends who yask. Plan seems to be to get in a couple more rounds of heavy killing, while reducing in good order to an air-sustainable (and -withdrawable) secure general assassination/deterrence/training capacity ASAP. Anything more represents a check we can’t cash in terms of long-term commitment to controlling events on the ground.

  2. @ CK MacLeod:

    I tend to think of Afghanistan as connected to Pakistan and the region and believe that our presence on the Af side of the border is going to determined by what we see, or wish to see, in the neighborhood.

  3. @ fuster:
    I think you may have greater optimism than I do about being able to shape events positively. What we may wish to see may not be realizable at any cost we’re willing or able to pay, if at any cost at all, while there’s significant reason at least to question whether efforts in that direction don’t make some things a lot worse, first for the locals, eventually for us.

  4. Of course we can shape things positively!!!

    Have you learned nothing from Ronald Reagan?

    Who else would have sent an autographed bible to Tehran?
    Had he not, those cats would have gone on causing trouble.

    WE may not all be that inspired, but if we keep the Pakistanis from making Afghanistan a terrorist settler state, we might be able to win some influence in India, maybe help Pakistan give up the idea of using xenophobia as a method of diverting their populace from noticing the failure of their government.

    Maybe get the Pakistanis to change course and see the wisdom of spending their time and money to develop their economy instead of sinking it into the military.

    Probably won’t succeed, but keeping Pakistan from getting worse and falling apart might be possible.

    We put half as much time and resources as we expend on Israel/Palestine, we’re gonna do better in Pakistan then we have in that other worthless piece of real estate.

  5. The Afghan war is costing us ca. $10/bn month and forcing us to swallow an awful lot from the Pakis because we’re dependent on them for supply routes.

    Pakistan’s total nominal GDP is only ca. $180 bn/year. Even judged by the alternative standard (parity purchasing power), our war investment is ca. 25% Pakistan’s entire GDP.

    Besides, how are we supposed to shape anything positively without 4 more carrier battle groups and replacing Medicare with Christian charity so we can be a shining city on a hill without sharia law?

  6. The problem has always been Pakistan, from the ISI to the madrassas, which cultivated the cadres of Haquanni, QST, Khalis’ the father of the Taliban, Sayyaf, and Hekmatyar, who recruited the bulk of the Afghan
    Arabs, including Bin Laden, he is just a symptom of the problem, of course, this ‘redeployment’ will just encourage them again, as similar
    circumstances reccurred during the 90s, I know it gets in the way of
    your visions out of the Handmaid’s Tale, but that is the reality.

  7. @ CK MacLeod:

    Supply routes fro sure, but we swallow much from Pakistan because it’s vastly more important than is Afghanistan and we wish to exert as much influence there as we reasonably can, given that under our present governmental conditions, is nearly impossible to get allocated non-military aid in even a fraction of the sums easily obtained for the military.

    All Hail Reagan (AGNB)!

  8. @ miguel cervantes:
    What makes you think “the problem” is isolated to Afghanistan, or is going to be helped, or has been helped, or has been helped in an even remotely efficient way, by a large expeditionary deployment of this type? Why is that a good use of $120 Billion a year? Forever? If not forever, then until what? fuster wrote:

    given that under our present governmental conditions, is nearly impossible to get allocated non-military aid in even a fraction of the sums easily obtained for the military.

    …reinforcing the same dysfunctional syndrome that requires it as a fuzzy answer to a fuzzy question.

  9. Of course, there is the problem, of making sure that said funds don’t get attached to certain sticky fingers, associated with the Government, Rashid points out in that previous linked piece that Lieven, whitewashes two much of the ISI role in much of the ‘unpleasantness’ yes as Ian Johnson points out this has been long standing Us policy, particularly against a neutralist if not openly
    Soviet aligned India, that may explain the scant attention we showed
    to AQ Khan,

  10. @ fuster:
    Er… there’s nothing you couldn’t justify with that non-rationale. Iraq, Lebanon, Vietnam, Bay of Pigs, four additional carrier battle groups, Watergate, whatever – and long thought particularly dangerous when applied to open-ended military operations. The end point is either the end of democratic control or a breakdown in public confidence and eventual military paralysis, or both and more.

    Not worth it to pretend really, really hard that we’re going to un-ring the 9/11 bell with good ol’ American ingenuity.

  11. nothing’s gonna change 9/11, but that’s not what we’re after. we’ve got some people to kill, and some minds to change, and some conditions to change as well so as to minimize the likelihood of more 9/11s.

  12. If the newly restructured force was more special forces, rather than support personnel, which maybe with Flynn and Mcraven’s imput, which MacChrystal was cheated out of, it might work, resurrecting
    ‘Seven Days in May’ has little resonance here, recall the background
    to that, was a decade long campaign in Iran, that didn’t end well,

    Of course, when we had a smaller force, there was an insistence it had too few people, consistency, small minds, yadda, yadda.

  13. @ fuster:
    Those are abstractions. What reason is there to believe that the people we need to kill are where we’re killing them, that we’re changing any minds or more minds for the better than for the worse, that we can change conditions (social, material, political, etc.) positively enough to justify the cost, and that the intervention actually minimizes whatever likelihood of additional 9/11s – that whatever threat there is of additional 9/11s is actually minimized through this kind of effort? At this point, it seems to me more like a guess, or like wishful thinking.

    @ miguel cervantes:
    Thank you, Mr Vice-President.

    The danger isn’t Seven Days in May. It’s more like all May all the time.

  14. @ CK MacLeod:it’s just been demonstrated that we can put the people we kill anywhere we need them to be.

    I’m not sure that any cost-justification for the changes in conditions that we manage is not too complex to be calculated till later, ‘cept for obvious failure.

    The Head of theMay 365 team ….

    and alternate (right)

  15. It’s arguable specially after the Northwood revelations, that they intended Lemnitzer, not LeMay, Knebel had been a long time Washington correspondent, and premises like ECOMCON and Site Y
    would apply more in this case.

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