Forecasting the failure of politics as we think we know it

Jonathan Bernstein has put up another of his useful “don’t believe the hype” notes from his Plum Line position at the Washington Post.  Having already disposed of 3rd party fantasies, he takes on (my renderings) “surprise candidate,” “presidency bought by big spenders,” “brokered convention,” “Republicans depressed by crappy candidate,” “electorate moved by big debate” among other popular election themes, before moving to a modified re-statement of his political scientist’s credo:

Politics combines regularities that can be observed and extrapolated from — and human action, which is unpredictable. And so there’s every chance that at least something will happen that really is a break from the past. Which means that every prediction or Iron Law of Politics should have a clear caveat that it’ll only work if people behave as they normally do. Which almost always is the case. Except when it isn’t.

I’m going to flatter myself with the notion that my numerous comments at JB’s plain blog (leading to this recent exchange – me, him) helped encourage JB to emphasize that final caveat. The remaining question, and I would (continue to) argue the only truly interesting question, is what about the shape of the current political-historical moment suggests that the framework is shifting, or even coming apart, and whether it could do so fast enough to matter in relation to our conventional expectations regarding those (not quite) Iron Laws JB mentions.

One favorite known unknown in contemporary political conversation is “Europe”:  It plays a similar role to “Iran” in ’08, the assumption being that the exogenous event – war or economic calamity over there – might completely alter the electoral framework over here.  In regard to conventional political discussion, which under the influence of political science as well as American tradition is highly economistic, “Europe” translates as “re-worsening economic performance makes Obama’s already difficult re-election equation all but impossible.”

Alternatively, an unexpectedly short-term positive (relatively expansionary) outcome in Europe might boost short-term US economic growth prospects, meaning that the path of least resistance and of likely success for Obama and his coalition would lead through the “normal” (postwar traditional) neoliberal framework: Things seem to be getting better, incumbent wins, everything stays pretty much the same at least on the surface. In short, we could go back to sleep for a year or two, and push any sharpening of contradictions into the future for at least another cycle.

The other two alternatives are “double dip recession” and “economic apocalypse.” In the former case, Obama would have the seemingly very low odds task of persuading the public that his perceived failure to re-make the world to our liking was still something better than what the Rs would do in his place: “The deluge is rising, buy our lifeboat.” This approach is similar to what the late Tony Judt called the “social democracy of fear.” It arguably has worked politically in Western democracies at historical turning points  – the key example for us being FDR’s progressive liberalism vs. the Depression and associated challenges to democratic capitalism.

Judt’s idea does help explain how familiar social welfare and insurance programs were built up over the course of the 20th Century, but the underlying message is not how Americans since World War II have been used to thinking of our politics. We have inherited a politics of ascendancy, or, more popularly, “exceptionalism.” Americans imagine that America is always getting better, bigger, happier, and, if it isn’t, they have been able to afford venting their frustrations on whoever is in charge, while little changes.

The closer the “double dip” is perceived to be “apocalypse,” the more attractive the lifeboat, and also the greater the potential for a new political framework that replaces those not-really-Iron Laws of bourgeois political science as practiced by JB and his colleagues, from center-right to center-left, within the punditocracy and academe. Whether Obama is capable of jumping all the way from the neoliberal lifeboat to the more radical-transformative dinghy that many of his supporters thought they were voting for in ’08 remains at best uncertain, as does the different question of whether the jump will or could be successfully landed, but the crisis that makes centrist political science untenable would correspond to, be the same as, the crisis that makes centrist politics untenable.

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6 comments on “Forecasting the failure of politics as we think we know it

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  1. Yeah, as I said before, I just don’t get it, do I?

    I wonder what would happen iftheceter ofgravity of our politics, f of the commentary on it wasexplicity, somthing like “jeeze, beats the hell out of me.”

    I know as a parent that there are times during which overcome with panic and uncertainty you (try) to project calm and confidence because if you don’t things really fall apart. But we’re all supposed to be adults here and it’s not if all the bluster and fake confidence is getting us anything.

      • (No edit link)

        I don’t even get what I don’t get, but if I had tomake a stab at guessing it would be what everyone else seems so sure about eg surprise gop candidtate,brokered convention,iron laws, iron laws except when they aren’t,my own certainty that I don’t get it…

        I know we find patterns where they are none, or where we don’t have the info to see any tht are there and that’s a evolutionary adaption, it’s better to guess that there’s danger where there isn’t than to guess there isn’t any when there is.

        I mean not only do I not get it, but I can’t seem to explain what I mean.

  2. I’d say most people gave up trying to be sure and for the most part thinking that what they think could matter, but up to around 60% or so in a Prez election year are willing to take the democratic version of Pascal’s wager – they don’t know if American republican democracy is right or works or exists anymore if it ever did or could, but… just in case…

    … and that’s more than enough demand to produce an exploitable market for political opinions…

    …though I’m more frequently of the opinion that it’s like a big stage play that can’t possibly come together but can’t possibly not… kind of like what’s going on with Europe right now… Did you ever see SHAKESPEARE IN LOVE – can’t find the quote right now – but there’s a point near the end where Geoffrey Rush explains to the confused investor in the production, who sees it all falling apart, how that’s what the whole thing is really about, it’s always that way…


    bob: (No edit link)

    Consarn it! (logged in? right after the date/time under your name? via dashboard with screen options to show recent comments enabled?))

  3. I hadjust givenup on the edit link, so I jsut signed in, and signed in the edit appears pretty much everywhere, in the post, the dashboard, I can even edit other people’s comments now.

  4. hmmm, either I misremembered or there were different scripts. Henslowe (Rush) does comment to the investor about the absurdity of the production, but the dialogue I recall is between Shakespeare and Henslowe regarding the premiere (which at that moment seems to be dissolving into chaos).

    (to HENSLOWE)
    We are lost.

    No, it will turn out well.

    How will it?

    I don’t know, it’s a mystery.

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  1. […] Jonathan Bernsten has his story and he’s sticking to it:  The Newt surge is a mirage; Newt remains an “implausible” candidate; and Romney’s still the favorite, by far, on the R side.  The alternative would amount to an overthrow of everything he thinks he knows. […]

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Noted & Quoted

TV pundits and op-ed writers of every major newspaper epitomize how the Democratic establishment has already reached a consensus: the 2020 nominee must be a centrist, a Joe Biden, Cory Booker or Kamala Harris–type, preferably. They say that Joe Biden should "run because [his] populist image fits the Democrats’ most successful political strategy of the past generation" (David Leonhardt, New York Times), and though Biden "would be far from an ideal president," he "looks most like the person who could beat Trump" (David Ignatius, Washington Post). Likewise, the same elite pundit class is working overtime to torpedo left-Democratic candidates like Sanders.

For someone who was not acquainted with Piketty's paper, the argument for a centrist Democrat might sound compelling. If the country has tilted to the right, should we elect a candidate closer to the middle than the fringe? If the electorate resembles a left-to-right line, and each voter has a bracketed range of acceptability in which they vote, this would make perfect sense. The only problem is that it doesn't work like that, as Piketty shows.

The reason is that nominating centrist Democrats who don't speak to class issues will result in a great swathe of voters simply not voting. Conversely, right-wing candidates who speak to class issues, but who do so by harnessing a false consciousness — i.e. blaming immigrants and minorities for capitalism's ills, rather than capitalists — will win those same voters who would have voted for a more class-conscious left candidate. Piketty calls this a "bifurcated" voting situation, meaning many voters will connect either with far-right xenophobic nationalists or left-egalitarian internationalists, but perhaps nothing in-between.

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Understanding Trump’s charisma offers important clues to understanding the problems that the Democrats need to address. Most important, the Democratic candidate must convey a sense that he or she will fulfil the promise of 2008: not piecemeal reform but a genuine, full-scale change in America’s way of thinking. It’s also crucial to recognise that, like Britain, America is at a turning point and must go in one direction or another. Finally, the candidate must speak to Americans’ sense of self-respect linked to social justice and inclusion. While Weber’s analysis of charisma arose from the German situation, it has special relevance to the United States of America, the first mass democracy, whose Constitution invented the institution of the presidency as a recognition of the indispensable role that unique individuals play in history.

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[E]ven Fox didn’t tout Bartiromo’s big scoops on Trump’s legislative agenda, because 10 months into the Trump presidency, nobody is so foolish as to believe that him saying, “We’re doing a big infrastructure bill,” means that the Trump administration is, in fact, doing a big infrastructure bill. The president just mouths off at turns ignorantly and dishonestly, and nobody pays much attention to it unless he says something unusually inflammatory.On some level, it’s a little bit funny. On another level, Puerto Rico is still languishing in the dark without power (and in many cases without safe drinking water) with no end in sight. Trump is less popular at this point in his administration than any previous president despite a generally benign economic climate, and shows no sign of changing course. Perhaps it will all work out for the best, and someday we’ll look back and chuckle about the time when we had a president who didn’t know anything about anything that was happening and could never be counted on to make coherent, factual statements on any subject. But traditionally, we haven’t elected presidents like that — for what have always seemed like pretty good reasons — and the risks of compounding disaster are still very much out there.

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