Si Vis Bellum, Part 1: “Militarism” and “Interventionism”
The un-clarity or confusion, or confusion of confusions, regarding the meaning of these two terms is typical of this historical moment, which in one sense can be thought to have simply befallen us, having never been willed into existence by anyone, but in another sense can be viewed as the predictable and desired product of choices made over the course of at least two or now three presidential elections, in as self-conscious a manner as a mass democratic system is able to undertake.
I’m inclined to think that the U.S. is fairly interventionist by whatever the proper measuring stick is (even taking into account its perhaps unique role). But I’m not at all sure what the proper measuring stick actually is.
…Jason offered his view of what the critical constituency is, and I offered mine… that, from where I sit, as center-left political establishments go, ours seems quite on-board for interventions. The explanation for it is indeed a fully separate conversation. I’m just saying that it is the critical piece in what actually leads to the actually-more-militaristic policy.
But then Kolohe came along and questioned the whole premise – that the U.S. even is more interventionist than, say Europe (which I think is the proper comparison, though that too can be debated) – and also that the U.S. center-left is more interventionist/militaristic than Europe’s. And while I tend to still think the U.S. is quite interventionist, I’m more interested in assessing that question than insisting I’m right about it.
I mostly agree with Kolohe’s position as I understand it. I am also, like Michael and Jason – and like Tyler Cowen, to whom Jason was originally responding – interested in assessing the underlying question further, or, as Cowen puts it, in examining characteristic American attitudes, customs, or predispositions as an “integrated whole.” However, as I stated earlier in the conversation with Michael and Kolohe, I believe that this project is a more ambitious and difficult one than either Cowen or Jason acknowledges. We could, for example, seek to follow and extend Hegel’s comprehension of the interdependent development of “the gun” and “the state” in world history, specifically in relation to the American idea of the state or American Idea, and in part to define the differences between the American and Hegelian state concepts (see “Inventing the World.”), but any attempt to synthesize or fuse two such large and controversial topics as American foreign policy and American attitudes toward guns risks merely being confusing if the central terms are not more carefully defined and employed. Simply achieving such definition will still require entering into that “fully separate conversation” on explanations for the existence of the “critical constituency” or any merely functional description of it.
The first impediment to comprehension – or grasp of bases and justifications – is the general one of imprecision in conventional political discussion. In writing on “isms” that sometimes stand mainly for intellectual orientations, sometimes for realized policies, sometimes for group affiliations, sometimes for some or all of these and so on at once, vagueness and lexical drift can render any account or argument a hopeless muddle, while endangering any further prospect of our making our positions understood to each other or even to ourselves. When any speaker or writer refers to a “militarism” that we all or almost all reject, it may not be the same “militarism” referenced by the same speaker or writer or listener or reader at another point in the same discussion, to say nothing of political discussion generally. As a substantive matter, a practice, condition, approach, or action that might qualify as “militaristic” – or, in my view a different thing, “interventionist” – in one set of circumstances and under one set of definitions, or for some reasonable observers, might qualify as merely prudent or necessary from some other reasonable point of view or in different circumstances.
The question might be whether “militarism” does or it might be whether it should or it might be whether it does and should stand for us (whoever that is) for a military-centric ideology or outlook of some kind, or whether it does or whether it should stand for belief in the value of maintaining a strong military, or whether or does or whether it should stand for a belief in an ultimate recourse to military action at all, or whether it does or whether it should stand for a political-cultural or political-economic condition of being dominated by a large military apparatus or, as we have said since Eisenhower, by a “military-industrial complex.”
If, for example, an invading army was massing on the borders of my country, and I called for military countermeasures or even an emergency militarization of state and society, would that make me a militarist, and equally for Tyler as for Jason as Kolohe? Is “militarism” to be considered the only alternative to pacifism, or, in this example, to surrender?2 Should “militarism” to be treated as the inevitable destination of whichever other path or compromise – regardless of intention or initial conditions? Or should “militarism” be a term reserved only for certain extraordinary cases – like the “Prussian militarism” of which historians speak?
Similarly, does or should “interventionism” stand for a general belief that intervention by one country in the affairs of another is ever justifiable? How much difference does it make whether that intervention is primarily military, and, either way, whether the primary intention or perceived or honestly declared objective is defensive or humanitarian? According to whom? Or does “interventionism” stand for any excessive tendency to intervene politically, or diplomatically, or international-legally or economically or militarily, regardless of intention or effect? If so, what do we mean by “excessive”? Or, if intervention is ever justifiable, then how do we determine whether an intervention was questionably enough justified to be declared excessive, or whether some particular relative frequency of interventions demonstrates an excessively “interventionist” tendency?
Returning to that discussion a year ago, in my view the problem is compounded in Cowen’s and Jason’s treatments, and carried over into Michael’s and even Kolohe’s, by a shared assumption that “militarism” leads to “interventionism,” and likewise that the latter implies the former, to the effect that the two terms, which none of these gentlepeople pauses to define, can be used virtually interchangeably. Opponents of American policy historically and up to the present have, of course, insisted that, regardless of what Americans believe or say about themselves and their aims, the U.S. has been and remains objectively highly militarist, interventionist, and imperialist, even that American policy serves the objectively imperialist character of capitalism as a system – that the Pentagon serves Wall Street. Such contentions are often accompanied by recitation of comparative national defense spending figures as in both Cowen’s and Jason’s posts. Armed similarly, one commenter under contemporaneous discussion at Ordinary Times insisted that the disproportionate American investment in defense is “preposterous.” Such observers seem to believe that the numbers incontrovertibly prove that America is “militarist” – somewhat as the American role in sundry “interventions” since World War II would appear to justify Michael Drew’s “inclination” regarding his views on American interventionism.
If such claims and usages often pass without comment, the explanation may be that no one using or interpreting either term is doing so on the basis of any clear and consistent definition. I will argue that the un-clarity or confusion, or confusion of confusions, regarding the meaning of these two terms is typical of this historical moment, which in one sense can be thought to have simply befallen us, having never been willed into existence by anyone, but in another sense can be viewed as the predictable and desired product of choices made over the course of two or now three presidential elections, in as self-conscious a manner as a mass democratic system is able to undertake. I will argue further that the unavailability to engaged and well-informed citizens of that “measuring stick” to which Michael Drew referred reflects the disorientation of a global political-economic system whose bases and justification are, increasingly, no longer grasped by those whom it is intended to serve, including those tasked at the same time with administrating it, and I will at length emphasize what I think ought to be obvious: that the predicament seems dangerous, something like insecurity itself, or the realization in worst possible experience of the worst possible failures of understanding.
This post and the two that will follow, God-willing, were mostly composed in December and January of 2015-6, but withheld as, among other things, likely un-discussable during the developing political campaign, even while events potentially critical to the historical argument seemed to be developing. While recently re-reading it, I considered publishing it in the underused “Untimely” category, but I do not find it untimely, and have not found the series in need of more than incidental updating – although I’m also not sure that it’s really any more discussable than it would have been or might have been one year ago. [↩]
…or, perhaps, to truly “open” borders or no borders at all, presumably the end of the nation-state as we know it. [↩]
Writing since ancient times, blogging, e-commercing, and site installing-designing-maintaining since 2001; WordPress theme and plugin configuring and developing since 2004 or so; a lifelong freelancer, not associated nor to be associated with any company, publication, party, university, church, or other institution.
To take power, May had to pretend that she, too, dreams these impossible dreams. And that led her to embrace a phony populism in which the narrow and ambiguous majority who voted for Brexit under false pretences are be reimagined as “the people.”
This is not conservatism—it is pure Rousseau. The popular will had been established on that sacred referendum day. And it must not be defied or questioned. Hence, Theresa May’s allies in The Daily Mail using the language of the French revolutionary terror, characterizing recalcitrant judges and parliamentarians as “enemies of the people” and “saboteurs.”
This is why May called an election. Her decision to do so—when she had a working majority in parliament—has been seen by some as pure vanity. But it was the inevitable result of the volkish rhetoric she had adopted. A working majority was not enough—the unified people must have a unified parliament and a single, uncontested leader: one people, one parliament, one Queen Theresa to stand on the cliffs of Dover and shake her spear of sovereignty at the damn continentals.
...Brexit is thus far from being a done deal: it can’t be done without a reliable partner for the EU to negotiate with. There isn’t one now and there may not be one for quite some time—at least until after another election, but quite probably not even then. The reliance on a spurious notion of the “popular will” has left Britain with no clear notion of who “the people” are and what they really want.
The most extraordinary paragraph in this op-ed, however, is this one:
The president embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. We bring to this forum unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral strength. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace it.
...First — and this is so obvious I can’t believe I have to type out these words — the United States can’t simultaneously proclaim “America first” and then claim any kind of moral strength. Saying loudly and repeatedly that American values are not going to be a cornerstone of American foreign policy strips you of any moral power whatsoever.
The second and bigger problem is that the “embrace” of a Hobbesian vision of the world by the most powerful country in the world pretty much guarantees Hobbesian reciprocity by everyone else. Most international relations scholars would agree that there are parts of the world that fit this brutal description. But even realists don’t think it’s a good thing. Cooperation between the United States and its key partners and allies is not based entirely on realpolitik principles. It has helped foster a zone of stability across Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim that has lasted quite some time. In many issue areas, such as trade or counterterrorism or climate change, countries gain far more from cooperation than competition.
Furthermore, such an embrace of the Hobbesian worldview is, in many ways, anti-American.
The rise of the military, if coupled with the undermining of civilian aspects of national power, demonstrates a spiritual exhaustion and a descent into Caesarism. Named after Julius Caesar — who replaced the Roman Republic with a dictatorship — Caesarism is roughly characterized by a charismatic strongman, popular with the masses, whose rule culminates in an exaggerated role for the military. America is moving in this direction. It isn’t that some civilian agencies don’t deserve paring down or even elimination, nor is it that the military and other security forces don’t deserve a boost to their financial resources. Rather, it is in the very logic, ideology, and lack of proportionality of Trump’s budget that American decline, decadence, and Caesarism are so apparent.
Aleppo, D.C. (OAG #7) December 15, 2016 The Fall of Aleppo and the virtual Fall of Washington are linked not just by the lead sponsors or perpetrators of such unimaginable or until recently unimaginable crimes, but by a long and apparently far from finished history of bipartisan and cooperative failures and omissions that, removed from context, provide illimitable opportunity for internecine partisan…
Comments On Ecology and War July 13, 2012 I am not asserting that conquering the will to conquer nature, or conquering human nature, or ending conquering, etc., whichever or whatever it comes to, must entail great violence, nor am I calling for it. I am however recognizing that violence would in some sense be normal, because whether or not you or I call…
What neither a “drone court” nor any other legal structure will change about our system February 10, 2013 To step back from the Armageddon-level options that still follow the U.S. president around in a briefcase, there remains only a post hoc and in the highest sense political check on a president's interpretation of Article 2 powers. In non-global-apocalyptic but merely national apocalyptically extreme cases, a president may even interpret his designated and implied…
CK MacLeod's uses browser cookies because CK MacLeod thinks without them, your experience of the site and its features would be sub-optimal (and that goes for most of the other sites you like, too, very probably). No serious private info of possible serious interest to seriously anyone is involved: More info, just ask me!.Ok