Si Vis Bellum, Part 3: Always Again

If members of the present younger generation in particular seem unable to articulate or comprehend the basis of a still operative policy consensus, they can hardly be faulted if their elders, even those running for the highest office in the land, can no longer do so either. We seem to be preparing and in effect demanding – perhaps cannot help but to require – a repetition, or at least a reinforcement, of the very old lesson.

The rationality and utility of the concept informing American strategy or grand strategy since World War II, in some sense merely an elaboration of simple practical wisdom in relation to geographical facts of life, as much a result as an intention, or as much objective as subjective, have been taken to have been confirmed repeatedly, painfully, and incontrovertibly by historical experience. American opinion, as expressed via accountable democratic processes, has accepted and ratified this strategy or strategic premise – or, less pretentiously, this general approach to America’s peculiar position in the world – as on balance both materially successful and morally defensible. Both the American strategy and the popular acceptance of it by Americans have defined the status quo as well as a durable center of gravity in international relations and global affairs for three generations.

We can therefore re-frame the argument made previously in relation to “conventional wisdom” and electoral politics: Those prejudicially applying the terms “militarist” and “interventionist” to that strategy and its realization in American policy are implicitly seeking to alter both, to impeach them morally, and to overturn them. The desire for an alternative has influenced major elections and nominating processes, and to have undercut major political initiatives.

s-l1000

For sale on eBay, and seen on the road by the author…

Thus, for example, the compromise that finally ended debt limit and related budget brinksmanship apparently turned on miscalculations regarding the sacrosanctity of defense budgets to Republicans. In another signal moment for the Obama Administration, its reversal on Syria policy – a moment when, apparently to the President’s surprise, the command “never again!” received no resounding echo from the American populace – was likewise a discovery by praxis of the same alteration in the substructure of American policy. This change or possible change has, of course, been nowhere more evident than in the recently concluded 2016 election campaigns, won by the “America First” nominee and his sometimes reluctant party against a representative of the liberal-internationalist status quo, literally the former Secretary of State, seemingly the very incarnation of globalism under American leadership at this moment.

The Syria reversal and the 2016 electoral campaigns are two of the clearest indicators or realizations of a long-developing loss of American foreign policy coherence, even if the inherited “militarist” and “interventionist” policy may remain the default position, or revivable, for a long time yet to come. That opponents of President Obama’s proposed and withdrawn punitive strikes against the regime of Bashar al-Assad would have included many of the same people, including many who count or counted themselves Obama supporters, who were thrilled by Donald Trump’s attacks on George W. Bush’s Iraq policy, underlines the uncertainties of this moment: Members of that virtual coalition will be found dissatisfied or appalled by each other’s preferred alternatives to the two-sided neo-conservative and liberal-internationalist consensus, since those alternatives, ranging from left or right neo-isolationism and pacifism to one or another so-called Jacksonian, bloody-minded version of “more rubble, less trouble,” “Let Allah sort it out,” or “Build the Wall – Kill ‘Em All,” could not be more contradictory in spirit.

At the very obvious very least, the memory of the World Wars, along with those who observed them firsthand, is disappearing, and, if members of the present younger generation in particular seem unable to articulate or comprehend the basis of a still operative policy consensus, they can hardly be faulted if their elders, even those running for the highest office in the land, can no longer do so either. We seem to be preparing and in effect demanding – perhaps cannot help but to require – a repetition, or at least a reinforcement, of the very old lesson. Yet the ancient adage on wanting peace merely deploys irony on behalf of practical wisdom in general, or mastery by indirection of a rule of unintended consequence: An adage is not a policy prescription. The adage does not tell us what level of investment would be adequately “para bellum” to get us the desired “pacem.” Nor does it tell us whom we should count as primary enemies, nor what to do when we suspect the enemies are among us, or suspect that we ourselves are indeed the ones we were really waiting for.

Nor in all likelihood, if possibly for us or anyone, would we be or remain able to apply the ancient wisdom unless collectively responding to a fear felt deeply, down to the roots, as inescapable experience rather than abstraction, or the inexorable replacement of “never again” by “again and again,” or even their convergence.

We Did It Before And We Can Do It Again (WW2 Cartoon)

“The World around the United States” map was originally created for The National Atlas of the United States of America (1970), a U.S. Government publication.
The famous animated musical sequence, based on the popular song by Dick Robertson and the American Four, is from the cartoon “Fifth Column Mouse” (1943) – an expression, almost a recapitulation, of Americanism at its zenith.


WordPresser
Home Page  Public Email  Twitter  Facebook  YouTube  Github   

Writing since ancient times, blogging, e-commercing, and site installing-designing-maintaining since 2001; WordPress theme and plugin configuring and developing since 2004 or so; a lifelong freelancer, not associated nor to be associated with any company, publication, party, university, church, or other institution. 

Posts in this series

18 comments on “Si Vis Bellum, Part 3: Always Again

Commenting at CK MacLeod's

We are determined to encourage thoughtful discussion, so please be respectful to others. We also provide a set of Commenting Options - comment/commenter highlighting and ignoring, and commenter archives that you can access by clicking the commenter options button (). Go to our Commenting Guidelines page for more details, including how to report offensive and spam commenting.

  1. “America First” vs globalism is IMO an argument on false grounds to begin with. The assumption that both start with is that the conduct of the US abroad has been selfless & for the greater good of the world as whole, whether they think the status quo is good and should stay or they think that the US is somehow getting a Raw Deal out of it & should renegotiate more favorable terms.

    A lot about how the world reached this point and the motives of those who drove it here is either omitted or outright lied about for most people. It hasn’t been selfless at all, rather it’s been led with a focus on Western centered transnational capitalism & the maintenance of such, including trade terms & security of resource extraction: Capital First, more like. What the “America First” crowd is doing (even if they don’t specifically intend to) is using the existence of common people in the US who have not been sharing in the spoils to say “you’re losing because America is losing”, sliding what could’ve mushroomed into a class issue into the blanket of nationalism. The default “globalists” meanwhile see America First nationalism as merely vulgar — The maintenance of Western power & transnational capital needs to keep cosmopolitan makeup on its face & eloquence on its tongue in order to do the job. Neither actually brings up who in the grand scheme of things has filled the Winners & Losers boxes in the context of Why.

    The still dominant international order has worked great for a few people in the world beyond ones wildest dreams. It has at times placated some others to varying degrees by way of how the wealth extracted from it has been distributed. But it has been willfully brutal to the periphery, in continuance of what they faced from foreign powers prior in all but name.

    When people in other nations talk of putting their country first, unless their proposal for such happens to not particularly undermine the current global system much, America (or rather its political elite) tends to frown upon that.

    • “America First” vs globalism is IMO an argument on false grounds to begin with. The assumption that both start with is that the conduct of the US abroad has been selfless & for the greater good of the world as whole, whether they think the status quo is good and should stay or they think that the US is somehow getting a Raw Deal out of it & should renegotiate more favorable terms.

      I don’t think that this description applies to either side. Neither assumes that the “the conduct of the US abroad has been selfless,” and neither depends on the argument that such conduct, selfless or not, has necessarily been for the “greater good of the world as [a] whole.”

      “America First” obviously places all other nations in second place at best. Different America Firsters might or might not believe that US conduct or policy has been on balance beneficial to others, in one way or another. They might believe that it has been at times beneficial, at times destructive. They appear most strongly to believe that, whatever you might conclude about benefits to others, to treat or to pretend to treat the welfare of others as of main or of equal concern in policy, is some combination of dangerous, counterproductive, disadvantageous, and unsustainable.

      The globalists may likewise embrace a range of different opinions about one or both premises, but the special problem with defining globalism in these terms – regarding selflessness and regarding the greater good – is the view among its main proponents that a political economy based on an assumption of universal selfishness – also the primacy of the individual “self” and his or her inalienable rights – achieves the best really available results, materially and otherwise, or that, in short, with some loss in translation, “greed is good.” The belief or argument is, of course, that the policy centered on the primacy of the individual, or understood in the classic utilitarian manner as a policy of “enlightened self-interest,” happens to be best for all, if, quite justly, often best of all for those who practice it, or who are able to practice it, most consistently. However, one does not have to take the premise to Randian extremes: A good globalist can put as great a stress on the “enlightened” part as on the “self” part, and understand that a successful or pragmatic implementation must always aim for balance and attend to mutual interest. Involving others whose participation is necessary to the success of one’s own self-interested doings requires one to put the argument on their interest to them, and may require emphasis, even exclusive emphasis, on that aspect in public statements and dealings (what you would call “lying”).

      Put differently, an America Firster and a globalist might look at figures reflecting vast improvement by common measures (life expectancy, literacy, energy consumption, etc., etc.) in the lives of great masses of people, or across a world popuation three times as high as it was at the outset of Pax Americana , and reach two different conclusions: The Firsters say, “Maybe the world should thank us, but, typically, neither the world nor least of all the leftists, pacifists, multi-culturalists etc. among us will do so. Anyway, we’ve done enough, and we have every right to concentrate on our own interests as we see fit, just like everyone else.” The globalists look at the same facts and figures, then add the pages that demonstrate, on the one hand, maintenance of American relative primacy, and, on the other, the vital interdependence of the global system: “Look how well we’ve done both for ourselves and others, and look how much we and the rest of the world would be endangered, both materially and morally, if we abandoned the project.”

      Neither, incidentally, denies that the process has been brutal for those at “the periphery.” The Firsters are defined as such by their relative lack of interest in the question. Some might believe that such is the way of the world sooner or later, and that pretending otherwise is foolish and dangerous, though they might also believe that once things are ordered properly, Americans as a matter of fact, in only as a function of geography, would probably be able to get away with a lot less of it. In the meantime, that the elite or most winning winners continue to act in their own perceived self-interest, to say whatever they need to see or even believe whatever they need to believe, etc., is completely predictable. Why would you expect anything else of them – or anyone – than to behave according to perceived self-interest? Some get “enlightened,” some don’t.

      To return to an old argument between us: It might look like we or the global system we have created has taken billions of people hostage. Perhaps it was a terrible mistake, whether intended or not, but, even if so, where is your reason to believe, or argument for me to believe, that pulling it apart and down could be undertaken as selfless action for the greater good of the whole world? What if the process would have to be ruled by more common motives – or with no single set of ideas and intentions at all? How much suffering by how many of those billions would you be willing to discount in favor of your preferred political concept, and what would insulate you from the moral indictment you’re making now against the evil global capitalists?

      • If the globalists actually believed in inalienable & individual rights then they would strongly oppose anything that involved overriding such rights when asserted by others.

        In practice, they don’t.

        This is what I refer to by it being a false distinction. It wasn’t an America First open national interest type that supported, for example, the coup in Honduras — it was Hillary Clinton. If that’s what the “globalists” do, then the difference is marketing, not principle.

        A true globalist view would start with a default position towards the world of respect and peace, and respond to the internal politics of other countries with “there’s no legitimate reason for us to override anyone”. That is, it’d be a perspective that actually sees the globe as populated with equals, rather than seeing it as something to be bent to a particular will.

  2. ” have been taken to have been confirmed repeatedly, painfully, and incontrovertibly by historical experience.”

    I think you are saying, via the passive construction, that the *perception* is that American grand strategy has been successful since 1946 (or 1941). Do you believe that’s the actually the case?

    I do believe that it *has* been the case, on net, but that’s 1) a bit of hindsight bias and 2) perhaps giving too much credit to intention, vice impersonal economic and socio-cultural forces and 3) really putting a lot on the math of ‘on net’ because there’s been a whole lot of deliberate decisions that have not been successful (Vietnam), and actively been harmful (Iraq).

    ( I do not put Vietnam in the same category as Iraq. I put it in the same category of Korea, a hot spot in the cold war that didn’t work out as well as Korea.)

    To me, the ‘memory’ of the World Wars has been long dead, to the extent that it influenced either US Grand strategy or any push for ‘never again’, died at the height of the Vietnam war. WW2 valorization only came back big time after the Cold War ended, and the youngsters that had fought WW2 were getting older and dying, and a bunch of boomers in the media and culture industry revived interest in the last great ‘good war’ – as a generational atonement for how they acted during Vietnam.

    In another signal moment for the Obama Administration, its reversal on Syria policy – a moment when, apparently to the President’s surprise, the command “never again!” received no resounding echo from the American populace – was likewise a discovery by praxis of the same alteration in the substructure of American policy.

    I think a very important detail that’s omitted here is that it wasn’t the American public that weighed in – it was the British one. Obama’s heuristic for differentiating between ‘good’ wars and ‘bad’ (or stupid) wars is largely “do my friends agree with this” or even “are they willing to take point on this”. It’s the same sort of thing that lead the mockery of the coalition for OIF (‘don’t forget Poland’)

    Obama didn’t ask the American public for ratification of the Libyan military intervention – and no one really cared. He wasn’t prepped (IIRC – I could be off about this) to ask the American public for one for Syria either, but the UK govt *did* seek a Parliamentary authorization – which was defeated to everyone’s surprise (it’s the sort of thing that normally causes the PM to resign. He would do so next time he was surprised). The imminent military action against Syria was only halted because of the UK balking, and the Administration was flailing about until the Russians(!) swooped in with a face saving (and Assad saving) deal regarding the chemical weapons.

    • I think you are saying, via the passive construction, that the *perception* is that American grand strategy has been successful since 1946 (or 1941). Do you believe that’s the actually the case?

      I’ll invite you to read the phrase you select in its context, since I also observe your later question on intentionality – in other words the question that I have examined at greater length elsewhere, as to whether American grand strategy is better viewed as a consciously adopted design or a somewhat spontaneously arising or simply emergent construct, including the adoption and development of a political-economic system that is much better at avoiding encumbrance by design or by what would be, for America, a land gratuitously favored by geography and history, foolishly counterproductive lesser intellectual consistencies, including any untoward consistent inconsistency. Up until now, but not necessarily tomorrow, America has been able to do quite well materially, which is what “matters” for us self-reflexively. The “success” of the American grand anti-strategy strategy is its or America’s continuance in being as combined “richest and most powerful” nation, or the production and maintenance of a world system that suits the interests of Americans as Americans (in particular but not exclusively) collectively understand them.

      Whether this type of success is itself likely to be successful for much longer, and whether and to what extent its terms can or must be altered, is a different, too interesting question, that would circumscribe all questions of the success or failure of American policy or war-fighting at particular conjunctures – whether at a nadir or perceived nadir like the Vietnam War or zenith like the break-up of the Soviet Empire. The importance of the legacy of WW2 would not be in particular subjective attitudes about or knowledge of the events of 70 years ago, or in the amount of attention paid to “the Greatest Generation,” or even in the regular invocations of Munich!, Pearl Harbor!, Auschwitz!, Hiroshima! et al! in winning political-military arguments, but in a world system lent order and integrity by actualized and latent American power or “superpower” or “hyperpower.”

      The example or counterexample you give, of the British influence on the Syria decision could be argued in any number of ways in this context. That the U.S. would be dependent on British opinion for validation might support the same declinist conclusions I was pointing to in regard to “signal moments.” Surely the world-historical power at its zenith would easily set aside hesitations by one of its subordinate allies, if it chose to, or, better, the subordinate ally would have kept its irrelevant opinions to itself, and so on. The rest of your depiction, including the perceived failure of Obama-Clinton’s Libya experiment in “leading from behind,” likewise supports the argument on the “discovery by praxis of the same alteration in the substructure of American policy.” At that point in the development of the argument I’m remaining agnostic as to the depth and significance of that alteration.

  3. Since that previous comment got too long, wanted to put thoughts about the overall series separately.

    To be honest, I still don’t quite get your core thesis across the three pieces. Like, I literally don’t understand what ultimate point you are trying to get across (so I can know if I agree or disagree! :))

    Is it: US geopolitical power, economic, diplomatic, and military, should be used to keep the global peace, as well as stave off and fix humanitarian crisis. But the US making a bollocks of the effort over the last two (and maybe three) Presidential administrations has fatally wounded that effort to the extent it requires public support?

    If so – I see where you’re coming from, and I used to be in favor of that, but I’m no longer interested in the US being the world’s policeman. Because we inevitably make a hash of it, and the world is basically ungrateful for the effort.

    Is it – The failure of US Presidential administrations to demonstrate success to the American public regarding foreign policy risks a general disengagement from the world, that then, if the world goes to shit, would rebound to a result to a America that’s even more militaristic and interventionist?

    If so – well, first, I don’t see the world going to shit if America withdrawals. Some places will, some places will stand on their own feet. In any case, it’s a risk I’m willing to take.

    The definition of militaristic has been somewhat murky in these pieces. Interventionist can be descriptive without being necessarily pejorative, but militaristic cannot.

    I don’t want the US to become more militaristic, but I don’t think the US will become more militaristic, and I don’t think we’re very militaristic now. Notwithstanding all the various ‘support the troops’ commercials and media events that still permeate society, the fact is the number of personnel in uniform is pretty much the lowest per capita it’s been since before WW2. (and was on pace to get even smaller).

    We have families where everyone is in the military, and sections of the country where military service is more commonplace, either for a few years or an entire career. But we really don’t have the Prussian Junker-State nexus here. Our right wing political leaders more often eschew military service than they embrace it.

    • To be honest, I still don’t quite get your core thesis across the three pieces. Like, I literally don’t understand what ultimate point you are trying to get across (so I can know if I agree or disagree! :))

      No doubt entirely my fault. It could be that the “core thesis,” stated as such, is too obvious and banal to be acceptable on its own terms, so I had to write n-thousand words obscuring it. So in that sense I may have been successful, with the only problem being that the result turned out not to be worth reading.

      So, sorry for that. My current plan is to write a single reply to you and b-psycho and anyone else who cares to chime in after a decent interval has passed, though I’m also thinking over whether it would be more helpful to discussion to address secondary questions separately.

    • Interventionist can be descriptive without being necessarily pejorative, but militaristic cannot.

      “Militaristic” most certainly can be non-pejorative, descriptive–it can even be a term of praise. It all depends on one’s predilection, one’s preference. If one is animated by an anti-militaristic passion or prejudice, then “militarism” is presumably a “pejorative” term. If one is animated rather by a martial passion, then “militarism” will be a laudatory term.

      Sparta was militaristic and has rightfully had a multitude of admirers down through the ages. Prussia was militaristic–and had an admirer and apologist of the greatest intellectual stature and prestige in Hegel. Unified Germany carried forward the tradition of militarism right on up to 1945 and has its admirers even now, even in America. The Soviet Union was militaristic–I’m almost inclined to view the Soviet Union as Sparta on a continental scale–and carried out the most illustrious feat of arms in military history, the Great Fatherland War (as Harrison Salisbury translated that expression). No one could be blamed for admiring the Soviet Union in that respect–the Soviets saved Russia from extermination. Would a non-militaristic, “liberal” make-nice regime been able adequately to meet the onslaught? For those of us who admire these regimes, their “militaristic” character is no small part of why we do so.

      Have you ever considered the possibility that the reason you are averse to militarism is more than adequately explained by the fact that the regime which formed your character explicitly taught you to disapprove of (rival) militaristic regimes like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union?

    • To resume where I left off with the reference to my highlighted thesis statement, your various interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and would all be contained within it in some form. Where we differ especially is in your undeveloped statement about the world not “going to shit if America withdraws,” and such an eventuality being “a risk I’m willing to take.”

      I find that approach to what would be a matter of life and death for countless people, and the basic welfare of countless more, including Americans, including you and me, to be, to say the least, rather cavalier. It doesn’t rise to the level of the seriousness of the matter. See my questions at the end of my comment to Mr. BP above.

  4. It may be that the latin phrse is best understood as implicitly transitive: If you want to make peace with your enemy, prepare for war with him. Once the USSR reverted to Russia, that specific partner in global war and peace disappeared, replaced with just another regional power.

    The Right has had conniptions about their view that O’s has been unwilling to “name the enemy”. Doing so seems to provide, among other things, a unitary enough enemy to war/peace with. One of the problems with intervening in Syria has been the difficulty in having this kind of clarity – there just didn’t seem to be any guys good enough for us to fight with/for – both conceptually and operationally.

    In the Cold Way era, the conceptual clarity carried the day against any operational ambiguity. Now all we have is ambiguity.

    A new organizing phrase may be: If you want clarity, prepare for ambiguity. If you want ambiguity, prepare for clarity

  5. Members of that virtual coalition will be found dissatisfied or appalled by each other’s preferred alternatives to the two-sided neo-conservative and liberal-international consensus, since those alternatives, ranging from left or right neo-isolationism and pacifism to one or another so-called Jacksonian, bloody-minded version of “more rubble, less trouble,” “Let Allah sort it out,” or “Build the Wall – Kill ‘Em All,” could not be more contradictory in spirit.

    I certainly don’t object to being quoted–and, for those who don’t know and didn’t follow the link, yours truly is the source for the “Build the Wall — Kill em All” quote above–but the author has placed that (no doubt) “bloody-minded” sentiment in the category of a (rudimentary, for sure) foreign policy directive and thence assigned it to the “Jacksonian” camp. In my own mind, however, I wanted to affiliate myself with an extreme isolationism (not so much a “neo-isolationism” as an “archaeo-isolationism” along Spartan lines). “Kill em All” as a dictum was in no way aimed at foreigners outside the territorial bounds of the United States. To the end of making my meaning clear, the maxim might be paraphrased as “Keep em Out — Root em Out”. (Nonetheless, I do acknowledge that the author’s misunderstanding of my intention is entirely pardonable.)

    • I think I should make that “neo-conservative and liberal-internationalist.”

      As for where an “extreme” “archaeo-isolationism” might belong, I think it fits as one tendency among others within a larger reservoir of political sentiment that Walter Russel Mead and others have been calling “Jacksonian,” at least if we are willing to accept that much of the “Alt-Right,” including parts typically declared unsuitable for human consumption, also fits there. I am referring to a mutually reinforcing combination of aggressively combative attitude and ideology. To the extent that a familiar set of stances and reflexes will sooner or later be presented as “self-defense,” and that the same can be argued to go for everyone else, too, eventually, the real question may come down to different self-reflexive definitions of the self.

1 Pings/Trackbacks for "Si Vis Bellum, Part 3: Always Again"
  1. […] and extending thoughts I had in reply to CK MacLeod re: the “argument between “America First” and the status quo in the […]

Commenter Ignore Button by CK's Plug-Ins

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

*

Noted & Quoted

So, does Mitchell make any money on the work, which has been shared so many times? He uploaded a high-res image of the symbol and granted permission for anyone to use it personally for free. But for those who want to support his work or simply want something readymade, you can also buy T-shirts, sweatshirts, mugs, and journals emblazoned with the symbol through Threadless.“I really just want to spread the image as much as possible and cement it in history,” Mitchell says. “In all honesty, the amount I’ve made from my Threadless shop so far is still less than my hourly rate, so I don’t really see it as a big deal. If you look at my Twitter, half the replies are people wanting to know where they can buy a shirt. Threadless is happy to help them out with that, and so I’m happy to let that happen.”Now that the symbol has flooded our streets and our timelines, Mitchell just has one request: “Impeach this idiot already,” he says.

Comment →

This is a Waterloo moment for Trump, the tea party and their alliance. They have been stopped in their tracks not only by Democratic opposition but because of a mutiny within their own ranks. Although never particularly liked or respected, it is now clear that they are no longer feared. The bankruptcy of their ideas and their incompetence have been exposed. Their momentum has been dissipated. Their rejection of political norms has itself been scorned. Our long national nightmare may finally be coming to an end.

Comment →

One seasoned Democrat told me that among the reasons Trump won in 2016 was that a long year of Crooked Hillary talk, about emails and Goldman Sachs and the like, had steadily demoralised and demobilised the liberal base. If sustaining fury at Trump helps keep those same voters energised, so they eventually turn out to defeat him, it’ll be worth it, he says.

But it can’t just be in the form of world-weary, if witty, tweets. What’s needed is a coherent argument, one that explains why Trump’s repulsive behaviour matters. For Americans, that will surely centre on the state of their society. The civic realm is being degraded by Trump’s lies, vanities and insults. The national conversation is being coarsened. The basic democratic assumption, that disagreements can be resolved through discussion rather than coercion and violence, is being eroded from the very top. Note the language of Scaramucci’s outburst: “I want to fucking kill all the leakers.”

Comment →
CK's WP Plugins

State of the Discussion

infobae
Ignored
Comments this threadCommenter Archive

I really appreciate your input. Currently, I've been pondering and studying most of this and I'm delighted people are doing the very same.

David Bentley Hart as Atheist (On Creative Principle and Creator Principal)
CK MacLeod
Ignored
Comments this threadCommenter Archive
+ BTW, I recently upgraded some this and that on the back end of the blog, and it does seem to make comments post much faster [. . .]
Gutenberg: The Invention of the Printing Press, the Destruction of WordPress
CK MacLeod
Ignored
Comments this threadCommenter Archive

For WordPress self-hosted people, there is already a "restore legacy editor" plugin, even though Gutenberg hasn't been installed yet as the default.

Gutenberg: The Invention of the Printing Press, the Destruction of WordPress

Extraordinary Comments

CK's WP Plugins

Categories

Related