Post-theism would be the obsolescence of traditional theisms in the age of the rise of the Nones, although I will continue to treat it as form under the more general heading of anismism, since any assertion of “ism” that does not immediately undermine itself remains ismistic.
The eternal crosses infinitely all the way over to us on the finite cross. Even against the definitional and lethal disagreements within and between the Abrahamic faiths on instantiations of eternity, or finitizations of infinity, or mortalities of the immortal, the structure of the central question, as a dichotomy to be resolved into a unity, from incarnation to crucifixion to resurrection, survives all answering exclusions. We can even begin with the atheistic or heretical counter-narratives that insist that indispensable parts of the greatest story were merely story, that the humanly fallible texts amount to a pre-capitalist commodification for “franchising” purposes. Even the falsehood of the tale would precisely on its own level magnify it, as the greatest lie ever believed, in this the only world the closest a disenchanted perspective can approach to miracle.
As far as I know, there is no single prophet of anismism, and that lack of a prophet may be appropriate if not inevitable to this particular anti-ideological ideological stance. If there could be such a prophet, however, Anandamayi Ma on first glance seems to fill that role well, which is to say incompletely and therefore completely, paradoxically and therefore simply, because her anismism extended crucially to the question or her own existence as a self.
The religious affiliation of no religious affiliation among the so-called Nones may amount to a kind of popularized phenomenology or ambulatory deconstruction, the realized impossibility of the declaratory faith, potentially an actuality of belief independent of whatever verbal reduction or sign, if also potentially a condition of incoherence, of chaos not system, moral infantilization rather than advancement.
(longer version of a comment left at a typically impossible discussion of Carl Schmitt at the Crooked Timber blog.)
the single most interesting question he raises, if not uniquely, then signally, is the constitutional paradox of the constituting/constituted power. That still deserves consideration.
I agree with this observation, and I've read all of JCH's comments on this thread with interest, while recognizing the difficulty and perhaps the impossibility of what he's trying to do here - among other things trying to defend an interest in "the enemy" to the enemy's committed enemies. (THE ENEMY was the title that Gopal Balakrishnan gave to his very useful intellectual biography of Schmitt, published in 2000[ (( The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt )) ]). Quite often, this very difficult if not impossible exercise coincides with another difficult impossibility: of trying to do philosophy on a blog comment thread.
It is just a bit more than merely ironic that those perplexed by the theory of the primacy for politics of the friend-enemy distinction so frequently and perhaps universally operate from friend-enemy presumptions in their discussion, or most typically in their refusal of actual discussion, of the same concept. That this problem would tend to recur is one strong implication of the theory underlying Schmitt's "Concept of the Political." A second or corollary implication is that this concept of the political implies a politicization of the concept, and finally collapses into or is revealed to rely upon, is an argument or the argument on, the concept of concepts at all. The question of the sovereign decision ex nihilo turns out to be a form of the more general and more basic question of existence ex nihilo - another form of the "why is there something and not nothing?" and another form of the "why am I bothering to offer a comment on a blog thread?" or "why am I declining to continue this discussion?"
(At CT I ended the comment there, but I'll choose here to continue a bit further:)
The explicability of the (any) decision (including the omission or refusal of decision) is inherent in the decision as a potential, but its not being entirely known or knowable, its character not yet having been determined, is what differentiates the decision as decision, or subjective experience/experience of subjectivity or of freedom of the will in the moment of decision (presence as self-presence at all), from that which is to be decided upon and the moment of decision, as concretely the result (result of results) of all decisions already made. "Who has not sat in suspense before his heart's curtain?"
The poet implies that we all have had that experience. One might suggest further that "to be at all as a 'who'" means to be in such suspense. It is in that moment that who one is or we are or we are/always were/are-going-to-be-henceforth is revealed to us, that we reveal ourselves to ourselves, as though from nothing - applying Schmitt's formulation regarding the sovereign decision. Only afterwards, precisely as in the judgment of a crime or in the larger "court of history," the individual's or society's or blog-thread-commenter's or the universe's true character having been revealed, does explanation including causal explanation become possible, though satisfaction, or the decision to be satisfied, necessarily and without exception takes a similar form (as necessity, as the exception). As was quite apparent to Kant and as we all know, but as we always eventually decide to suppress precisely in order to get on with life, the full explanation of the criminal's or the enemy's or our own conduct would eventually vacate the notion of any meaningful decision at all. My bad childhood produced my bad behavior. My bad education produced this incoherent blog comment. My loneliness and self-destructive tendencies explain why I am leaving why I did not leave this comment in full at this that forum full of mainly unsympathetic and even hostile interlocutors. Such totalities of explanation/explanatory totalities, or the position of complete determinism, eliminates subjectivity. They tell us that there never was nor ever is or can be a meaningful decision at all: There was the effect of causes, and the illusion of volition and meaning. Things did things to things, that is all (determinism as physicalist reductionism/eliminationism).
Naturally, inevitably, we or I refuse to accept this concept that has no meaningful spot for us or me, or, to say the same thing, we or I may at most pretend to accept this meaninglessness as meaningful: Either way, the origin of the self appears to be its own self-origination as though from nothing, in this instance in direct confrontation with the thought of its/my own nothingness: I insist on myself, on this now as not yet explicable, as still to be determined. For example, I might take the decision, and make what seems to me a fully reasonable decision, and what may turn out to be or to seem a fully explicable one, but without offering or being able to offer reason or explanation to myself or others, to stop here.
"Chris" notes that Civil War monuments are much more common in the South than the North.
Throughout much of the South, it is impossible to escape The War.
It may be objected at this point, by those of you who have spent time in cities and especially small towns in Northern states, that there are many Civil War monuments outside of the South as well. This is true: statues of Union soldiers in kepis and greatcoats are not uncommon in the North.
This contrasts starkly, however, with the sorts of monuments one sees in the South, which are much more numerous.
Chris's observations inspired extensive further discussion at Ordinary Times, including further evidence in support, as well as some speculation about this difference between North and South. Under Chris's post and elsewhere at OT - in commentary all written, of course, in the wake of the racist-terrorist atrocity in Charleston - proposals not just to "take down" the Confederate flag, but to destroy all Civil War monuments, even on both sides, were offered. No one, however, took up my argument or meta-argument, which I stated as follows:
I am skeptical of the notion that we can successfully and usefully discuss these matters in a forum like this one. We would have to be prepared to give, enforce, and rigorously respect and support a license to say, or be seen to say, or to risk being seen to say, many things that most of us have been taught from an early age to reject presumptively, and for good reasons. If word “got out” that we were having a truly open discussion of “identity” and the meaning of the Civil War and its symbols, we might find ourselves joined by unwelcome voices, and, in time, the kind of clashes and conflicts observable on the site in the last few days might seem but a mild foretaste…
I cannot say I mind remaining mostly unheard on this topic at this time, in such a context, as I do not expect that the license to which I refer would in fact be granted, enforced, respected, and supported, while the matter of those unwanted voices and associations would remain a problem. Perhaps sensing the same danger, or just not wanting to get caught in the fraught and froth, friend of the blog Will Truman also kept his own more reserved or middle-groundish comments on the topic on his own site.
Briefly on the question of the North and its relative lack of interest in the Civil War, we could say that the nation such as it is, in its entirety and also in all of its ceremonies, as in another sense the world in which we live, is itself the not always very well-kept monument to the victory. Purely from the perspective of war and its monuments understood more conventionally, the Union has other wars to commemorate and other sacrifices to honor. What is for the South as such "The War" is only "a war among others" for the Union, if clearly a singularly important one.
In yet another sense, and this one may be very difficult for those more Unionist than the Union to accept, if "Union" is an all-encompassing concept, then the Southern dead were "our" dead, too. They just did not know it, or did not truly become our dead until the Confederate cause was vanquished and, same thing, the cause of Union triumphed.
This mode of thought, a union of union and disunion, will be as it always has been difficult or impossible for anyone to master. It has many facets. Most of them appear in the realm of symbolic truth, which we occupy and which at the same time pre-occupies us for the most part unconsciously. Yet we all or most of us know that the tale of valor moves us even when we have no connection at all to the acts described, and even when they are completely fictional.
I feel I should also note that I have hardly ever been to the South, and that I have no roots in the South except very remotely. I do not offer these observations on behalf of Southerners. I have never felt great personal interest in the Confederate flag - or the Battle Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia - or seen great reason to identify with its cause or perhaps the different causes confederated but not united under it. Yet, to be more precise, I have recognized an inner response to it - perhaps as a (so we say) "white" man who has never felt fully included (anywhere), or as someone of a sometimes "rebellious" temperament, or as someone constantly exposed to statements attacking or critical of "whites," especially "white" "men," especially "white" "Christian" "men," in a manner that is not, for all of the very best reasons, allowed for any other group in current conversation. (Is there any other ethnically defined group that can be spoken of as "trash" in polite company?)
To grasp a phenomenon of the type Chris describes requires, I believe, going well beyond the questions of the moment, and to consider the nature of Southern culture beyond the matter of slavery or our retrospective judgments of the "Lost Cause."
Simple denunciation of the Confederacy serves present political purposes and deeper social-political constitutional purposes of various types. It is by now a commonplace, even among "supporters of the flag," to "confess" that the Civil War or the Confederacy really was about slavery. Yet to be "about slavery" must also be to be "about mastery." All of those monuments are, or are also, monuments to valor itself, to "mastery" of self or "dignity." The classic or ancient underlying moral justification for slavery - or for mastery - is that a man of honor, or a man worthy of respect, would rather die than be a slave or another man's slave. A man who would accept being a slave, by contrast, deserves to be one, and is a "lesser man," and it will be in the "natural order of things" for men unworthy of mastery to be mastered by those who refuse to be enslaved.
This view or attitude is or was hardly unique to the American South. To the liberal-democratist modern, or petit-bourgeois citizen, the premise suggests fascism, but merely to denounce something as fascist is not to explain why it deserves to be denounced and why we judge denunciation of it compulsory. Fascism as it developed included a re-emergence of the ancient ethos, or an unlikely or desperate attempt to grasp it again within modern mass society, but in other contexts it remains a revolutionary ethos, one to which we even in the good old bourgeois democracy pay highest tribute, as in "Give me liberty, or give me death!"
The slave mentality, which the fascist or Nietzschean crypto-fascist, but also the revolutionary and the anarchist, will associate with the bourgeoisie and their "lackeys," if (very much) not with the bourgeois revolutionaries in their heroic moment, is "Whatever it takes, let me hold on to life a little longer." The latter is a common and instinctive sentiment, but not a "born rebel"'s sentiment and not a warrior's sentiment. Furthermore, to state what ought to be obvious but may not be so to a progressive pacifist or a progressive in peacetime, a soldier cannot operate on that basis (though an "office desk killer" or a "keyboard commando" may, at least up to a point). As long as a nation needs or perceives that it needs soldiers - warriors willing to kill and be killed for the sake of a solemnly asserted higher and necessary purpose - then it will need that sentiment or ethos, meaning that nation will need to teach, cultivate, and honor that ethos, and commemorate those who exemplify it.
The disproportionate representation - which at first seems so contradictory - of Southerners in the military of the victorious Union, Confederate battle flag next to Old Glory, up to the present day, tends to suggest that we have made use of the South or Southern culture in this way - as a repository or reserve for our "manly," military virtues. Very widely recognized political-cultural tendencies distinguishing the South from the rest of the country, in election after election and not only in elections, further support this hypothesis.
It serves all of the very best purposes to describe all of those monuments as monuments to slavery or to an "evil" system or, as is commonly asserted, to "hatred" - but, as belief in slavery is connected to a belief in mastery, the presence of hatred implies a love violated or endangered, or perceived to be violated or endangered. Such love may comprehend love of kith and kin, love of place, and the "greater love" affirmed in John 15:13. These may all be or seem interconnected to the lover.
It may be difficult or unwise to consider or admit too much of the above too openly within the cultural mainstream, at least for anyone with any aspirations to remain within or ever to enter it. Even more dangerous may be to admit, at least until all of the services are over and the internet is focusing on some new topic, and perhaps even then, to state that even the atrocity in Charleston was, for a weak and twisted and very young mind, a gesture of love, or a gesture in honor of a love denied, forbidden, and unrequited. By that dialectical logic of love and hate, attacking the crime as a "hate crime" or a crime of "bigotry" necessarily acknowledges this fact, if quietly.
"Bigotry" as we use the term also implies an unconditional love of one's own, a love unconditioned by reflection, or without second thoughts. The impulse toward love of one's own is, as even natural science has come to accept, virtually universal. Though mitigable, the preference for those resembling oneself is said to be biological, or authentically sociobiological. The related impulses seem to take as many different forms as human identity takes different forms, from love of one's parent or child or sibling or cousin over the stranger, to love of teammates or fellow fans. Human beings do not merely want, but apparently need or are driven to "belong," and not just because belonging serves immediate practical purposes - helps them get ahead, get better jobs, get by - but because they perceive that it involves them in a form of triumph over death, while connecting them to a life worth living at all, if any life is worth living.
The death on the battlefield, as is insisted in the words of that greatest of Civil War monuments, a verbal monument, can "consecrate" or "hallow" a ground and its cause. We know that our love for (identification with) child, or parent, or sibling, or community, or nation is more important and more real than our love for a sports team because, as others have sacrificed ("given the last full measure of devotion") for such love, so would we. For that matter, we readily acknowledge that a victory in sports or other realms of life won at cost of some sacrifice, if not an immediate sacrifice of life, is meaningful in that way, and may not be really meaningful except in that way.
"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends..." The Civil War monuments and the Confederate flag are, I believe, in some major part (for those who appreciate them perhaps the major part) kept or raised to honor such love and, in so honoring it, to participate in it and to preserve and widen its embrace. The flag in particular is seized upon or has been seized upon by members of a particular ethnically or even racially defined group denied, for all of the best reasons, a particular form of self-expression or expression of pride, and who are instead urged to identify with an established order morally defined by denial of that self-expression, in other words defined by their conceptual annihilation. The result almost suggests a bizarre scientific experiment meant to test the sociobiological theory mentioned above, with the further intention of driving a certain segment of society completely out of its mind, denying it a recourse for meaningful expression of identity except as identification with its proscription.
You can go to any number of web sites - all by definition outside the mainstream - to find those forbidden expressions. I won't repeat or summarize them here. I do not like them or support them, but I will note that, in my observation, they are rarely or never confronted on their own terms by those who attack them, since by definition such views are not just outside but beneath the level of the mainstream, for all of those same best reasons: They are not discussed nor are they to be discussed. The refusal to discuss them, or to treat them as discussable, is fundamental for us. If they are brought up at all - perhaps on the fringes of popular culture - it will be to witness them being rejected all over again, at every appearance, since that is part of what defines our social and political order morally - this union or Union of "reconciliation and inclusion" defined by the refusal to reconcile with or include one type or group and its symbols.
Perhaps we can do without the martial virtues, if they are or ever were "virtues." Maybe we will instead find some other place to locate them or some other way to draw upon them. Or maybe they will not re-emerge sooner or later in something like their traditional form - only more so - and demand their due. Maybe suppressing the Confederate Battle Flag and denouncing those who raised it on whatever grounds, or who tattooed it on their arms, or who placed it on their album covers, or who decaled their computers with it, or who sold t-shirts and bikini tops and so on in honor of the once more fashionable rebel, will help persuade a certain type of "Southern Man" to surrender to, and come to identify with, a social and political system defined by its rejection of him.
As for Trumpism vs. Bushism, one will be no less dependent on "populist nationalism" than the other, to whatever extent it is also successful: In a mass electoralist national system under popular sovereignty, the winner will always be the truest national populist, by definition, if not necessarily the purest national populist according to some external or merely intellectual standard.
TV pundits and op-ed writers of every major newspaper epitomize how the Democratic establishment has already reached a consensus: the 2020 nominee must be a centrist, a Joe Biden, Cory Booker or Kamala Harris–type, preferably. They say that Joe Biden should "run because [his] populist image fits the Democrats’ most successful political strategy of the past generation" (David Leonhardt, New York Times), and though Biden "would be far from an ideal president," he "looks most like the person who could beat Trump" (David Ignatius, Washington Post). Likewise, the same elite pundit class is working overtime to torpedo left-Democratic candidates like Sanders.
For someone who was not acquainted with Piketty's paper, the argument for a centrist Democrat might sound compelling. If the country has tilted to the right, should we elect a candidate closer to the middle than the fringe? If the electorate resembles a left-to-right line, and each voter has a bracketed range of acceptability in which they vote, this would make perfect sense. The only problem is that it doesn't work like that, as Piketty shows.
The reason is that nominating centrist Democrats who don't speak to class issues will result in a great swathe of voters simply not voting. Conversely, right-wing candidates who speak to class issues, but who do so by harnessing a false consciousness — i.e. blaming immigrants and minorities for capitalism's ills, rather than capitalists — will win those same voters who would have voted for a more class-conscious left candidate. Piketty calls this a "bifurcated" voting situation, meaning many voters will connect either with far-right xenophobic nationalists or left-egalitarian internationalists, but perhaps nothing in-between.
Understanding Trump’s charisma offers important clues to understanding the problems that the Democrats need to address. Most important, the Democratic candidate must convey a sense that he or she will fulfil the promise of 2008: not piecemeal reform but a genuine, full-scale change in America’s way of thinking. It’s also crucial to recognise that, like Britain, America is at a turning point and must go in one direction or another. Finally, the candidate must speak to Americans’ sense of self-respect linked to social justice and inclusion. While Weber’s analysis of charisma arose from the German situation, it has special relevance to the United States of America, the first mass democracy, whose Constitution invented the institution of the presidency as a recognition of the indispensable role that unique individuals play in history.
[E]ven Fox didn’t tout Bartiromo’s big scoops on Trump’s legislative agenda, because 10 months into the Trump presidency, nobody is so foolish as to believe that him saying, “We’re doing a big infrastructure bill,” means that the Trump administration is, in fact, doing a big infrastructure bill. The president just mouths off at turns ignorantly and dishonestly, and nobody pays much attention to it unless he says something unusually inflammatory.On some level, it’s a little bit funny. On another level, Puerto Rico is still languishing in the dark without power (and in many cases without safe drinking water) with no end in sight. Trump is less popular at this point in his administration than any previous president despite a generally benign economic climate, and shows no sign of changing course. Perhaps it will all work out for the best, and someday we’ll look back and chuckle about the time when we had a president who didn’t know anything about anything that was happening and could never be counted on to make coherent, factual statements on any subject. But traditionally, we haven’t elected presidents like that — for what have always seemed like pretty good reasons — and the risks of compounding disaster are still very much out there.