I find that our discussions of the Afghan War are extremely depressing
Imagine how depressing they would be to the kind of person in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or beyond, whom we would like to encourage - including the people Biggio describes in his heartstring-plucking conclusion.
Why should even one more American soljah have to die?
Game over….time to go.
That's for Petraeus to seek to answer. If he can't persuade himself that there's significant ROI after costs, then it's his duty to say so, but it's naive simply to assume that hastily departing could be costless and riskless, just as it's wrong to assume that it might not turn out to be the best solution after all. His credibility is such that he could sell that alternative.
He has to deal with the real boys, girls, toys, and stuff, and all of the interested parents, relatives, friends, and enemies. He doesn't have a magic wand. "Get out quickly as possible" would itself be a major logistical, political, and military challenge - in which well more than "one more soljah" would very likely "have to die." It may very well turn out that the real world difference between "in it to win it" and "get the Hell out" isn't very great after all. I've always leaned toward that view.
@ narciso: Petraeus should start the withdrawal and open negotiations with the Taliban.
its too late for anything else.
Petraeus is a professional. He should do what he probably will do - what he's always done: Assess the situation in relevant logistical, political, strategic dimensions; define to the best of his ability the best likely achievable attainable/sustainable alternatives, then sell the plan according to a persuasive and defensible theory of comparative advantage - re-define and re-conceptualize the "game" as necessary to establish (or re-state) a range of outcomes representing "victory." That may also entail not saying certain things that all the same are embedded in the outcome, such as "we're more concerned that no one else wins than that we do," and "we just want to establish a pretext for a more firepower-intensive punitive-style response in the future if playing patty-cake doesn't get the job done."
Petraeus is supremely skilled at not saying the wrong thing - though he's human, as we saw during his Iraq testimony. But think back to what his "mistake" was: He answered a question regarding the larger strategic purpose, whether or not "victory in Iraq" was essential to our security back here at home, and honestly admitted uncertainty - because, as he later explained, it wasn't his job to think that question through in all particulars and time frames. Part of what he was doing was also re-defining the terms of the entire conflict, establishing a transition from "essential to win" to "good enough not to lose" but without saying as much, because you don't motivate the troops and the civilians by saying "we're in it not be seen to have lost."
@ George Jochnowitz:
Why ever would you assume that the recognition and realization of interests would be uniform across a massive population of human beings? The fraction in any population for whom virtue long triumphs over need is usually quite small.
@ Rex Caruthers:
JED, in my reading, favors regime change by any means necessary, with a sustained US military campaign against the nuclear and military complex held in ready reserve if less intensively "kinetic" alternatives don't do the trick in time.
I think most of the Contentionistas put nullification of the perceived Iranian threat first, regime change second.
@ George Jochnowitz:
It's been many years since I read the Nation with any frequency. One of the reasons I stopped was that I found it so predictable on the issues that interested me. So I have very low expectations. As to Commentary's openness, I have seen evidence of it on issues ancillary to its central interests. The fact remains that when I read a sentence like the one quoted from Tobin's post, I have no reason to treat it as anything other than ideologically pre-determined - agreeable to the already-persuaded or inclined-to-be-persuaded, unpersuasive to anyone else, uninteresting to anyone who has already read a version of it countless times.
@ George Jochnowitz: @ narciso:
You're both changing the subject, which wasn't whether or not Israel ever did a single righteous thing, or ever took a risk for peace, or ever lacked justification to keep its guard up, but whether Commentary/Contentions has ever taken a position on any issue of interest to both Israel and the US other than the one typified by Tobin's statement.
@ George Jochnowitz:
So, you're saying that at NO time since the birth of Israel, there never was a time that it might have made sense to ratchet the fear factor down... maybe just to see what it was like?
Seriously, I know my question in the first part may have seemed rhetorical, but some of you may have been reading Commentary a lot longer and more closely than I have. Can you think of an example of a post or article there that significantly called for Israel to be less "scared," take it easy, defer to Washington?
The Amalekites weren't the only ones under threat. I think there are several independent reasons why the Jews aren't often associated with Old Testament genocidalism, but the most compelling one is that the ideas follow the will, the will follows perceived needs and interests, and that a pretext with a direct connection to the present is more useful. Likewise, when Christians, Muslims, and "Marxists" have perceived philo-Semitism or neutrality to be more useful, lo and behold the ample present rationales backed up by historical and scriptural precedents flow forth.
@ George Jochnowitz:
That's a lot like saying that the Jews are enemies of humankind because the Old Testament called upon them to destroy non-believers, women and children included.
Rex Caruthers wrote:
Imagine how depressing they would be to the kind of person in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or beyond, whom we would like to encourage - including the people Biggio describes in his heartstring-plucking conclusion.
strangelet wrote:
That's for Petraeus to seek to answer. If he can't persuade himself that there's significant ROI after costs, then it's his duty to say so, but it's naive simply to assume that hastily departing could be costless and riskless, just as it's wrong to assume that it might not turn out to be the best solution after all. His credibility is such that he could sell that alternative.
He has to deal with the real boys, girls, toys, and stuff, and all of the interested parents, relatives, friends, and enemies. He doesn't have a magic wand. "Get out quickly as possible" would itself be a major logistical, political, and military challenge - in which well more than "one more soljah" would very likely "have to die." It may very well turn out that the real world difference between "in it to win it" and "get the Hell out" isn't very great after all. I've always leaned toward that view.
strangelet wrote:
Petraeus is a professional. He should do what he probably will do - what he's always done: Assess the situation in relevant logistical, political, strategic dimensions; define to the best of his ability the best likely achievable attainable/sustainable alternatives, then sell the plan according to a persuasive and defensible theory of comparative advantage - re-define and re-conceptualize the "game" as necessary to establish (or re-state) a range of outcomes representing "victory." That may also entail not saying certain things that all the same are embedded in the outcome, such as "we're more concerned that no one else wins than that we do," and "we just want to establish a pretext for a more firepower-intensive punitive-style response in the future if playing patty-cake doesn't get the job done."
Petraeus is supremely skilled at not saying the wrong thing - though he's human, as we saw during his Iraq testimony. But think back to what his "mistake" was: He answered a question regarding the larger strategic purpose, whether or not "victory in Iraq" was essential to our security back here at home, and honestly admitted uncertainty - because, as he later explained, it wasn't his job to think that question through in all particulars and time frames. Part of what he was doing was also re-defining the terms of the entire conflict, establishing a transition from "essential to win" to "good enough not to lose" but without saying as much, because you don't motivate the troops and the civilians by saying "we're in it not be seen to have lost."
@ George Jochnowitz:
Why ever would you assume that the recognition and realization of interests would be uniform across a massive population of human beings? The fraction in any population for whom virtue long triumphs over need is usually quite small.
@ Rex Caruthers:
JED, in my reading, favors regime change by any means necessary, with a sustained US military campaign against the nuclear and military complex held in ready reserve if less intensively "kinetic" alternatives don't do the trick in time.
I think most of the Contentionistas put nullification of the perceived Iranian threat first, regime change second.
@ George Jochnowitz:
It's been many years since I read the Nation with any frequency. One of the reasons I stopped was that I found it so predictable on the issues that interested me. So I have very low expectations. As to Commentary's openness, I have seen evidence of it on issues ancillary to its central interests. The fact remains that when I read a sentence like the one quoted from Tobin's post, I have no reason to treat it as anything other than ideologically pre-determined - agreeable to the already-persuaded or inclined-to-be-persuaded, unpersuasive to anyone else, uninteresting to anyone who has already read a version of it countless times.
@ narciso:
Hudna, shmudna. Are you certain that a truce between Hamas and the ZE wouldn't be better than the current dynamic?
@ George Jochnowitz:
@ narciso:
You're both changing the subject, which wasn't whether or not Israel ever did a single righteous thing, or ever took a risk for peace, or ever lacked justification to keep its guard up, but whether Commentary/Contentions has ever taken a position on any issue of interest to both Israel and the US other than the one typified by Tobin's statement.
@ George Jochnowitz:
So, you're saying that at NO time since the birth of Israel, there never was a time that it might have made sense to ratchet the fear factor down... maybe just to see what it was like?
@ Parson Logic T ReFog:
Vot, chu need to ask?
Seriously, I know my question in the first part may have seemed rhetorical, but some of you may have been reading Commentary a lot longer and more closely than I have. Can you think of an example of a post or article there that significantly called for Israel to be less "scared," take it easy, defer to Washington?
The Amalekites weren't the only ones under threat. I think there are several independent reasons why the Jews aren't often associated with Old Testament genocidalism, but the most compelling one is that the ideas follow the will, the will follows perceived needs and interests, and that a pretext with a direct connection to the present is more useful. Likewise, when Christians, Muslims, and "Marxists" have perceived philo-Semitism or neutrality to be more useful, lo and behold the ample present rationales backed up by historical and scriptural precedents flow forth.
@ George Jochnowitz:
That's a lot like saying that the Jews are enemies of humankind because the Old Testament called upon them to destroy non-believers, women and children included.