The Wiki article on Sunyata quotes The Dalai Lama ( n the Geluga section)
According to the theory of emptiness, any belief in an objective reality grounded in the assumption of intrinsic, independent existence is simply untenable.
All things and events, whether ‘material’, mental or even abstract concepts like time, are devoid of objective, independent existence [...] [T]hings and events are 'empty' in that they can never possess any immutable essence, intrinsic reality or absolute ‘being’ that affords independence.[51]
The "simply untenable" refers the dea that x entity is empty because when analyzed, it can not be found ie found to be truly exsting. This is also rendered as "x can not bear analysis". This analysis has three parts: x has causes and conditions wthout which to ceases to (exist)(function) ; it has parts upon which it depends and; its label is a conceptual designaiton which (without the perception of emptiness) imputes an impossible mode of being (inherent existence) onto the base of designation. Emptinesss can not bear this analysis any more than anything else.
To deny the inherent existence of this motion still allows its (and the comment's) conditioned and functional existence. After all this motion is dependent on it's existence on thought, subject etc.
In the PM approach, emptiness itself is a conditoned phenonomen with no inherent existence.
The PM approach is to make a non-affirming negation. Inherent existence is negated as an impossible mode of being. It does not affirm something in its place of inherent existence. This prevents the contemplation of contemplation of... loop - at least for a Buddha.
I assure you am not doing the PM view justice.
My question is despite all the twists and turns, does Hegel affirm anything as truly/inherently/by its own power/in and of itself/ideally existing?
I've been mulling this over, but can't fully think what I 'm getting at any rate not the least of problems is framing my mullifications. From a Prasangika Madhyamika viewpoint the crucial part here is: "our perception of a simple sugar cube right before our eyes implies numerous assumptions even before we consider the uses we might make of it, where it came from, etc."
In PM lingo, the most important of these assumptions (reflex is possibly a better characterization) is that it exists as a sugar cube without these assmptions ie to do so falsely imputes that there exists a sugar cube in and of itself. Imputing existence in this way is in fact a condition of the perception/awareness. Doing so makes uncondtioned awareness impossible.
All of this can be reframed by asking this: What does a Buddha see?
John 3:16 encapsulates a question, is belief static or dynamic? I believe threfore I am saved. Or, I believe and every action I take is the belief or nonbelief. That is, belief only exists in one's actions, not mental constructs.
This was brought home to me a few years ago when the local paper did a Christmas time write up of the Council of Churches's jail minstry. Outrage ensued at giving jail inmates small items that would make ther lives easier. Then outrage at the outrage ensued.
A minster wrote to the effect that Jesus died for our sins and that this was an object lesson on what happens when you turn the other cheek etc. That is all one had to do was beleive in Jesus. Acting like him was foolish.
"God becoming or incarnated as (a) human being remains the indistinction of transcendence and immanence, even if seen as the disappearance of the former into the latter. In all instances, questioning whether the result is to be thought “spiritual” (transcendent and absolute as for Hegel as Christian) or “material” (immanent and absolute as for Kojève’s Hegel as atheist) refers us back to the solution announced in Christ, and in principle socialized in secular modernity, and whose deferred collapse as difference or dichotomy is historical time."
The physical is the spritual, the spirtual, the physical.
The Wiki article on Sunyata quotes The Dalai Lama ( n the Geluga section)
The "simply untenable" refers the dea that x entity is empty because when analyzed, it can not be found ie found to be truly exsting. This is also rendered as "x can not bear analysis". This analysis has three parts: x has causes and conditions wthout which to ceases to (exist)(function) ; it has parts upon which it depends and; its label is a conceptual designaiton which (without the perception of emptiness) imputes an impossible mode of being (inherent existence) onto the base of designation. Emptinesss can not bear this analysis any more than anything else.
As I said, I'm not doing this justice.
To deny the inherent existence of this motion still allows its (and the comment's) conditioned and functional existence. After all this motion is dependent on it's existence on thought, subject etc.
In the PM approach, emptiness itself is a conditoned phenonomen with no inherent existence.
The PM approach is to make a non-affirming negation. Inherent existence is negated as an impossible mode of being. It does not affirm something in its place of inherent existence. This prevents the contemplation of contemplation of... loop - at least for a Buddha.
I assure you am not doing the PM view justice.
My question is despite all the twists and turns, does Hegel affirm anything as truly/inherently/by its own power/in and of itself/ideally existing?
I've been mulling this over, but can't fully think what I 'm getting at any rate not the least of problems is framing my mullifications. From a Prasangika Madhyamika viewpoint the crucial part here is: "our perception of a simple sugar cube right before our eyes implies numerous assumptions even before we consider the uses we might make of it, where it came from, etc."
In PM lingo, the most important of these assumptions (reflex is possibly a better characterization) is that it exists as a sugar cube without these assmptions ie to do so falsely imputes that there exists a sugar cube in and of itself. Imputing existence in this way is in fact a condition of the perception/awareness. Doing so makes uncondtioned awareness impossible.
All of this can be reframed by asking this: What does a Buddha see?
The means of justification is a major difference between Catholicism and Protestantism.
John 3:16 encapsulates a question, is belief static or dynamic? I believe threfore I am saved. Or, I believe and every action I take is the belief or nonbelief. That is, belief only exists in one's actions, not mental constructs.
This was brought home to me a few years ago when the local paper did a Christmas time write up of the Council of Churches's jail minstry. Outrage ensued at giving jail inmates small items that would make ther lives easier. Then outrage at the outrage ensued.
A minster wrote to the effect that Jesus died for our sins and that this was an object lesson on what happens when you turn the other cheek etc. That is all one had to do was beleive in Jesus. Acting like him was foolish.
"God becoming or incarnated as (a) human being remains the indistinction of transcendence and immanence, even if seen as the disappearance of the former into the latter. In all instances, questioning whether the result is to be thought “spiritual” (transcendent and absolute as for Hegel as Christian) or “material” (immanent and absolute as for Kojève’s Hegel as atheist) refers us back to the solution announced in Christ, and in principle socialized in secular modernity, and whose deferred collapse as difference or dichotomy is historical time."
The physical is the spritual, the spirtual, the physical.