10 Years Later: Declare Victory and Resume History

RealClearWorld – 9/11 and the Successful War

 

[I]nternational law has simply failed to address the question of how a nation-state deals with forces that wage war through terrorism but are not part of any nation-state. Neither criminal law nor the laws of war apply. One of the real travesties of 9/11 was the manner in which the international legal community – the United Nations and its legal structures, the professors of international law who discuss such matters and the American legal community – could not come to grips with the tensions underlying the resulting war. There was an unpleasant and fairly smug view that the United States had violated both the rules of war and domestic legal processes, but very little attempt was made to craft a rule of warfare designed to cope with a group like al Qaeda – organized, covert, effective – that attacked a nation-state.

As U.S. President Barack Obama has discovered, the failure of the international legal community to rapidly evolve new rules of war placed him at odds with his erstwhile supporters. The ease with which the international legal community found U.S. decision makers’ attempts to craft a lawful and effective path “illegal and immoral” (an oft-repeated cliche of critics of post-9/11 policy) created an insoluble dilemma for the United States. The mission of the U.S. government was to prevent further attacks on the homeland. The Geneva Conventions, for the most part, didn’t apply. Criminal law is not about prevention. The inability of the law to deal with reality generated an image of American lawlessness.

Of course, one of the most extraordinary facts of the war that begin on 9/11 was that there have been no more successful major attacks on the United States. Had I been asked on Sept. 11, 2001, about the likelihood of that (in fact, I was asked), my answer would have been that it was part of a series of attacks, and not just the first. This assumption came from a knowledge of al Qaeda’s stated strategic intent, the fact that the 9/11 team had operated with highly effective covert techniques based on technical simplicity and organizational effectiveness, and that its command structure seemed to operate with effective command and control. Put simply, the 9/11 team was good and was prepared to go to its certain death to complete the mission. Anyone not frightened by this was out of touch with reality.

Yet there have been no further attacks. This is not, I think, because they did not intend to carry out such attacks. It is because the United States forced the al Qaeda leadership to flee Afghanistan during the early days of the U.S. war, disrupting command and control. It is also because U.S. covert operations on a global scale attacked and disrupted al Qaeda’s strength on the ground and penetrated its communications. A significant number of attacks on the United States were planned and prosecuted. They were all disrupted before they could be launched, save for the attempted and failed bombing in Times Square, the famed shoe bomber and, my favorite, the crotch bomber. Al Qaeda has not been capable of mounting effective attacks against the United States (though it has conducted successful attacks in Spain and Britain) because the United States surged its substantial covert capabilities against it.

Obviously, as in all wars, what is now called “collateral damage” occurred (in a more civilized time it would have been called “innocent civilians killed, wounded and detained”). How could it have been otherwise? Just as aircraft dropping bombs don’t easily discriminate against targets and artillery sometimes kills innocent people, covert operations can harm the unintended. That is the nature and horror of war. The choice for the United States was to accept the danger of another al Qaeda attack – an event that I am certain was intended and would have happened without a forceful U.S. response – or accept innocent casualties elsewhere. The foundation of a polity is that it protects its own at the cost of others. This doctrine might be troubling, but few of us in World War II felt that protecting Americans by bombing German and Japanese cities was a bad idea. If this troubles us, the history of warfare should trouble us. And if the history of warfare troubles us, we should bear in mind that we are all its heirs and beneficiaries, particularly in the United States.

The first mission of the war that followed 9/11 was to prevent any further attacks. That mission was accomplished. That is a fact often forgotten.

***

 There is talk of a long war against radical Islam. It had better not be. The Islamic world is more than a billion people and radical Islam is embedded in many places. The idea that the United States has the power to wage an interminable war in the Islamic world is fantasy. This is not a matter of ideology or willpower or any other measures. It is a matter of available forces, competing international interests and American interests.

Ultimately, there are three lessons of the last decade that I think are important. The first is the tremendous success the United States has had in achieving its primary goal – blocking attacks on the homeland. The second is that campaigns of dubious worth are inevitable in war, and particularly in one as ambiguous as this war has been. Finally, all wars end, and the idea of an interminable war dominating American foreign policy and pushing all other considerations to the side is not what is going to happen. The United States must have a sense of proportion, of what can be done, what is worth doing and what is too dangerous to do. An unlimited strategic commitment is the definitive opposite of strategy.

The United States has done as well as can be expected. Over the coming years there will be other terrorist attacks. As it wages war in response, the United States will be condemned for violating international laws that are insensate to reality. At this point, for all its mistakes and errors – common to all wars – the United States has achieved its primary mission. There have been no more concerted terrorist attacks against the United States. Now it is time to resume history.

 

10 comments on “10 Years Later: Declare Victory and Resume History

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  1. Good thing I’m on temporary leave starting right after this last comment of mine. If that weren’t the case, I would contest the main points (if that’s what they can be called) of this post with vigor. I couldn’t disagree with them more and the worst part is that from what I can tell from this piece of crap, if I have had any influence on CK at all, it’s illustrated in reverse Scott-like assumptions like “Anyone not frightened by this was out of touch with reality.” That sounds like me only in reverse. The paranoia expressed throughout this post, however, goes beyond anything I could muster and again, every position taken is easily contestable to the extent that I’m fine with not wasting my time in the effort. Just to point out that I’m still the champ when it comes to globalized statements I’ll end with this: Every single claim in this post is dead wrong. CK may not be in the conservative asylum anymore but he’s still in his own. I hope he finds his way out.

  2. I also want to know about this “temporary leave” thing. I’ve been absent here quite a bit over the past few months…was I supposed to submit some kind of paperwork?

  3. It was initially mistakenly posted to the main page, so I can understand the mistake, even though Friedman writes much differently than I do, I think.

    However, I do think that Friedman offers a reasonable perspective, and I specifically selected segments from his post that bore directly on Scott’s assumptions as well as on Sullivan’s. At the same time, though Friedman is neither a pacifist nor a moralist, but a self-conscious realist or even ultra-realist, the practical implications of his views, at least regarding particular policies, dovetail more with Scott’s and Sullivan’s than with those of the increasingly isolated war on terror “dead-enders.”

    We don’t know what would have happened if our response to 9/11 had been “we understand, it’s our fault, we’ll try to do better in the future,” but one reason we don’t know is that it’s very difficult even to imagine such an alternative reality. “Blood will have blood” is an ancient dictum that we – all of us, not just the U.S. – are very, very far from having completely outgrown. We have done a good job, however, of inserting multiple layers of rationalization between primal bloodlust and policy formation. We make war, or shape our military responses to threats, as “the continuation of politics by other means,” not as “blood cries out for blood,” but we are aided in that process because the urge to gain revenge is itself already the emotionalization of one entirely rational response to perceived threats: to eliminate their source. This goes for animals in the wild as well as for human beings in civilization. It goes for the design of our very immune systems. It even goes for Scott’s pacifism, which, to the extent it’s not merely passivism, is a rational response to the perceived threat of militarism.

    So, we were going to respond to the events of 9/11, to the violent deaths of thousands of our fellow citizens and the clear statement of uncompromising violent intent against our civilization as represented in the 9/11 target set (finance/trade, defense, politics). It was rational to seek to defend against the threat as well as to seek to eliminate it at its source, to whatever extent we were able to do so.

    In some absolute Scott-Millerian sense, we ourselves always were and remain the real source of that threat, but the work of defending against and eliminating ourselves requires much more than a political system or a culture can consciously embrace. Overcoming that limitation and completely transforming politics would be the same thing. It’s a messianic project, a project for the true end of history.

    We’ll know when we’re ready for it because we’ll already be there. In the meantime, we may see our political system continually embracing our necessary self-destruction unconsciously – which may be how Friedman, Sullivan, and Miller meet up on another level, all aware, as I have argued before, that any war on the suicide bomber could only have itself taken the form of a suicide operation.

  4. @ bob:
    No paper- or pixel-work necessary. Scott’s just being polite, since he intends to be “away.” He’d probably have just let us know anyway, but he’s making a point of it underlining the fact since otherwise it might look like he was checking out in a pacifist huff, having had enough of us warmongering savage bastards or something.

  5. @ fuster:
    Fairly “in-play” for a Chomsky at bat, but the comments make up the difference – just in case anyone thought that schizophrenic inanity was solely the province of the Republican primary electorate.

  6. It is leagues better than Sullivan’s contribution, but it still ignores this war didn’t begin in 2001, or even when it was formerly declared in1996, probably closer to 1993, when the first attack occurred, and the Jerusalem Project, which not surprisingly was inspired by the strategem in Black Sunday. In some ways the fall of Libya and Egypt, fulfills the goals, in “Klausewitzian reverse fashion, politics are the extension of war.

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